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Abstract

This work presents a brute-force attack on an elliptic curve cryptosystem
implemented on UC Berkley’s TinyOS operating system for wireless sensor networks.
The attack exploits the short period of the pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) used
by the cryptosystem to generate private keys. The attack assumes a laptop is listening
promiscuously to network traffic for key messages and requires only the sensor node’s
public key and network address to discover the private key. Experimental results show
that roughly 50% of the address space leads to a private key compromise in 25 minutes
on average. Furthermore, approximately 32% of the address space leads to a compromise
in 17 minutes on average, 11% in 6 minutes, and the remaining 7% in 2 minutes or less.
Two alternatives to the PRNG are examined that mitigate the brute-force attack. The
alternatives are implemented on the Mica2 mote and examined to determine CPU cycles
for execution and memory requirements. The recommended PRNG requires 73 CPU
cycles in the worst case and uses 66 bytes of memory. The period of the PRNG is
uniform for all mote addresses and theoretically requires 6.6 years on average for a key
compromise for the attack used in this thesis.

xii

CRYPTANALYSIS OF PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS IN
WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS

I. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) hold the potential to revolutionize the fields of
remote automation and sensing. Applications range from non-invasive habitat
monitoring to battlefield surveillance. For sensor networks to reach their full potential,
security must be a consideration in designing the hardware and software for future
applications. Without security, WSNs could be rendered useless with simple denial-ofservice attacks or covertly monitored to learn confidential information. In a worst-case
scenario, the devices themselves could be subverted and used to distribute false
information to the listener. In data gathering applications such as habitat monitoring, the
data is simply lost or misinterpreted. In more sensitive applications, such as battlefield
surveillance, vulnerabilities could lead to loss of human life.
Sensor Network Security (SNS) is a growing field of research that presents
researchers with challenging goals under tight design constraints. The need for creative
and innovative security protocols is clear since current security primitives are too
resource intensive in terms of the power, memory, and processing capabilities of sensor
network nodes, also known as “motes”.
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1.1 Objectives
This thesis focuses on one piece of the overall security picture for WSNs, namely
the topic of pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) as they apply to SNS protocols.
Although a small, often overlooked piece of security algorithms, PRNGs hold the
potential to open up serious vulnerabilities in security algorithms. This thesis
demonstrates the weakness of a particular PRNG and how it leads to a brute-force attack
on a state-of-the-art cryptographic protocol. SNS protocols must be based on a strong,
sound foundation for future research and applications to move forward. In an effort
towards that end, this thesis also examines alternatives to the current PRNG and analyzes
the cost of implementing these algorithms.
1.2 Implications
This research attempts to provide a strong foundation on which to build future
SNS protocols. In addition, a thorough analysis of the de facto PRNG in use on the
widely distributed TinyOS operating system expects to yield valuable information to
engineers and scientists that design WSNs. The PRNG of TinyOS 1.1.x contains several
modifications to a well understood PRNG design [Sch96]. These modifications are not
documented in the code and the reasons for their introduction are not supported by any of
the known methods for altering the PRNG design [Sch96]. However, the PRNG
continues to be supported as is evidenced by its distribution with the beta release of
TinyOS 2.0. This research attempts to shed some light on the PRNG of TinyOS 1.1.x
and spread the word on its deficiencies. Ideally this results in engineers spending less
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time tuning their application to compensate for the PRNG and spending more time
developing the application.
1.3 Preview
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to important background information relevant to
information discussed in subsequent chapters. The reader is also briefly introduced to
related areas of SNS research. Chapter 3 states the problem and discusses the
methodology used to solve this problem. Chapter 4 presents the results and analyses the
data. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes by restating the problem, discussing the contributions
and significance of the findings and identifying areas for future work.
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II. Background
2.1 Introduction
Sensor Network Security (SNS) is a growing field of research that presents
researchers with challenging goals under tight design constraints. The need for creative
and innovative security protocols is clear since standard security primitives are too
resource intensive in terms of the power, memory, and processing capabilities of sensor
network nodes, also known as “motes”. This chapter introduces SNS and the problem of
key management in this design space.
Section 2.2 introduces distributed sensor networks (DSN) and current
technologies related to DSNs. Section 2.3 discusses the sensor network security and
introduces several problems related to security in sensor networks specifically focusing
on the problem of key management. Section 2.4 introduces cryptanalysis and describes
several variations of a cryptanalytic attack. Finally, Section 2.5 presents random number
generators and examines the pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) used in DSN
software.
2.2 Distributed Sensor Networks
DSNs are a sub-class of ad hoc networks. The key differentiation between ad hoc
networks and traditional networks is the absence of network infrastructure. Generally
speaking, ad hoc networks operate wirelessly, support distributed routing and support
some level of self-organization. Ad hoc networks can be broken into subclasses such as
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) in which most or all of the nodes are mobile or

4

distributed sensor networks in which most or all of the nodes possess a sensing
capability.
This section introduces the concept of distributed sensor networks. First, the
reader is introduced to the basic components of sensor networks. In addition, the demand
for low cost components is explained and the impact this has on the design of sensor
network technology is examined. Finally, popular hardware and software platforms are
introduced.
2.2.1 Sensor Network Components
An individual node in a sensor network is called a mote. Sensor networks are
envisioned to contain hundreds to thousands of these motes depending on the specific
application. Networks are created in an ad-hoc fashion and, besides the motes
themselves, have very little need for infrastructure. The networks are self organizing and,
depending on the application, can be distributed randomly or by purposefully placing
nodes at predetermined points, e.g., at hallway intersections inside a building [ASS01,
TAH02].
2.2.1.1 Mote Classes
Several variations of motes exist today. Most motes maintain some type of
sensing capability and wireless communication capacity. However, the actual motes
themselves vary to fit a wide range of functionality. DSNs require a tiered architecture
that results in a hierarchy of nodes with different capabilities at each level [HHK04].
Figure 1 illustrates this hierarchy. It is referred to throughout the rest of this section. An
important aspect of DSNs is that information typically flows up the hierarchy.

5

Some nodes perform sensing functions and represent specialized nodes of very
limited resources. These nodes are akin to UC Berkley’s Smart Dust motes [KKP99].
They are the lowest rung in the hierarchy in Figure 1. They typically do not

Thick lines represent
high-bandwidth channels

Internet

Information typically flows up...

Base Stations

High-Bandwidth
Nodes

Generic, multipurpose, sensing
platforms
Specialized nodes only communicate with nodes in
other tiers, not amongst each other

Specialized,
sensing nodes
No Routing Capability

Figure 1. A Hierarchical Structure for Wireless Sensor Network Components
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communicate with each other, but instead communicate with nodes higher in the chain
either when reporting information or when they are queried for data. A step above these
nodes is generic sensors that represent the workhorse of the sensor node classes. These
nodes are capable of interfacing with a wide variety of temperature, light, sound, motion,
pressure and heat sensors, among others. They have sufficient computation, battery and
memory capacity to process, store and transmit sensed and received data to other nodes in
the network. A typical example of this mote is the Mica and second-generation Mica2
[HiC02]. These nodes often communicate amongst each other, forming a multi-hop
network capable of communicating over greater distances than any single node.
Other nodes are designed for specific sensing functions such as video and audio.
These nodes have a greater capacity for computation, battery life and bandwidth then
generic sensor nodes. These high-bandwidth nodes also act as superhighways in a DSN
reducing the load on less powerful nodes [HHK04]. The application that the DSN is
designed for typically determines the number and concentration of these nodes, which are
typically fewer in numbers than generic-sensing platforms as shown in Figure 1.
Finally, most discussions of sensor networks involve the concept of a base station.
The base station acts as a gateway to more traditional networks, hence this type of node is
referred to as a gateway node. These nodes are designed with the state-of-the-art
technology and typically cost significantly more than other nodes in the network
[HHK04]. Figure 1 shows that more than one of these gateways may be present in a
DSN. When using two gateways, it allows the designers to place the nodes at the
boundaries of a DSN, thereby reducing the traffic load on adjacent nodes.
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2.2.1.2 Resource Constraints
Due to the nature of sensor networks in which hundreds to thousands of nodes
could be deployed, there is a demand that individual motes be low cost and unobtrusive.
The range of environments that motes could be deployed in requires that they be robust
and autonomous. These requirements have an impact on the design of the sensor motes
and the resources available to potential software applications. Specifically, sensors must
operate on a limited power supply since they are inaccessible . Power must be conserved
when receiving, processing and transmitting data. Computation and memory capacity are
limited to reduce cost and power. In addition, transmission range is limited to conserve
power [CKM00]. There are also practical limitations to transmission range, especially in
densely populated networks such as DSNs. For example, an unlimited transmission
range for every node in a large network results in increased contention for the shared
channel. Shorter transmission ranges decreases contention for the channel and increases
throughput.
Other constraints weigh in as well on specific types of applications. Many
applications, such as surveillance and environmental monitoring, require real-time
feedback. Other applications, such as habitat monitoring or scientific studies, may have
less real-time constraints, but could possibly require higher fidelity when reporting data
[CKM00].
2.2.2 Popular Hardware and Software Platforms
Early hardware platforms came in a variety of configurations and capabilities
[KKP99, PoK00, HiC02, HHK04]. Within the past few years, hardware platforms began
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to see second and third generation development. Subsequently the research community
moved to the de facto standard hardware platform of the Mica2 mote, which is presented
in the next section.
Very little documentation exists in the literature on the early operating systems
used during the development of the first generation of motes. TinyOS, introduced in
[HSW00], filled the need for system software to manage and operate the device.
Traditional embedded operating systems such as VxWorks, WinCE, PalmOS, and QNX
are designed for embedded PCs and require resources unavailable on a typical sensor
platform. Smaller real time executives such as Creem, pOSEK, and Ariel come much
closer to matching the resources available provided by DSN hardware [HSW00].
However, these systems are designed for a different operating environment and tend to be
control centric and do not support the efficient handling of hardware interrupts. Since
DSNs use radios that generate numerous hardware interrupts, this aspect of the operating
system becomes critical to power-efficient operation of the mote. This motivated the
development of TinyOS and contributed to the fact that it is the de facto operating system
used in DSNs. Section 2.2.3.2 describes the operation of TinyOS in detail.
2.2.2.1 Mica2
The Mica2 is an example of the generic sensing node introduced in Section
2.2.1.1. It is a commercially available mote in use by over 100 research organizations
[HHK04]. The Mica2 is a third generation sensing platform initially developed at the
University of California, Berkley and then later manufactured by Crossbow Technology,
Inc., a sensor systems technology company.
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The Mica2 mote operates an 8-bit Atmega128L processor running at
approximately 8 MHz on two AA batteries with two modes of operation, active and
sleep. It provides 128 kilobytes (KB) of programmable flash memory, 512 KB of
EEPROM, and 4 KB internal SRAM. The processor uses 8 milliamperes (mA) and ~100
microamperes (µA) when active and asleep respectively [SHC04].
2.2.2.2 TinyOS
TinyOS is a multi-threaded, event-based operating system designed for sensor
motes [HSW00]. It consists of a scheduler and a hierarchy of components. A component
consists of command handlers, event handlers, a bundle of tasks, and a frame. The frame
in this context is a fixed-size stack frame for storing the state of the currently running
program. Commands, events, and tasks execute within the context of a frame. Higher
level components issue commands to lower level components, and lower level
components signal events to higher level components [HSW00].
A set of tasks provide functionality for calling lower level commands, signaling
higher level events, and scheduling other tasks. Tasks are atomic with respect to other
tasks and execute asynchronously with respect to events. The obvious benefit of this
design is the allocation of only one stack to the currently executing stack, which creates
substantial savings in the memory constrained architecture of sensor networks [HSW00].
The atomic nature of tasks allows for the implementation of a simple FIFO task
scheduler. When the task queue is empty only an event can result in the scheduling of a
new task. This design allows for the power efficient use of the processor since an empty
task queue indicates that the processor can enter the sleep state. Hardware peripherals
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such as the radio or sensor, can be left active to wake up the processor as needed. These
peripherals signal low level event handlers via hardware interrupts, which can trickle up
through the component hierarchy, scheduling tasks as required by the application
[HSW00].
Each component must identify the resources it provides and the resources it
requires. The frame is statically allocated during compilation allowing the memory
requirements of the program to be determined before execution and preventing the costs
associated with dynamic allocation. Communication between components takes the form
of function calls [HSW00].
2.3 Security in Distributed Sensor Networks
There are a number of challenges to the deployment of a secure DSN. Not only
must the DSN designer consider the resource constraints of the motes, but the lack of
infrastructure inherent in ad-hoc networks has security implications as well. The first
examination of security in DSNs, as documented in [CKM00], identifies the critical
requirements and constraints in Sensor Network Security (SNS). It recognizes that key
management presents significant challenges to the deployment of a secure DSN. DSN
deployment in hostile environments also presents a unique challenge to security. Nodes
are likely to be left unprotected and exposed to physical access. Mote encasings must
provide tamper resistance and protection from physical destruction.
2.3.1 Attacks and Vulnerabilities
Many analyses of attacks and vulnerabilities in DSNs focus on routing protocols
[WoS02, HPJ03, KaW03, NSS04]. Wood and Stankovic focus on denial-of-service
11

(DoS) attacks at all levels in the DSN design space. Hu, et al. introduces the “rushing
attack” that pertains to on-demand ad hoc routing protocols such as DSR [Joh94] and
AODV [PeR99]. Karlof and Wagner perform an in-depth analysis of routing attacks and
countermeasures. They note that many security issues in DSN routing also pertain to adhoc network routing. However, the defenses developed for these attacks are not directly
applicable to the DSN environment. It is explicitly assumed that defenses using public
key cryptography are not applicable because they are too expensive. Although
countermeasures and defenses are developed in spite of this assumption, it remains to be
seen if defenses using public key cryptography are applicable to DSNs in light of work
done in [MWS04]. Newsome et al. provide an in-depth analysis of the “Sybil attack” and
offer novel defenses against it. A Sybil attack involves a malicious node or nodes
behaving as a larger number of nodes in an attempt to subvert network traffic.
2.3.2 Key Management
Key management in DSNs encompasses the problem of establishing a secret,
shared key for use in symmetric cryptographic algorithms. Symmetric algorithms use the
same key for encryption and decryption. Thus, modern computer networks require a
secure channel to distribute shared keys. The only secure channel available in DSNs is
the configuration phase when code is uploaded to the mote prior to deployment.
[CKM00] discusses in depth the constraints of DSNs as they relate to key management.
[HLV04] examines various energy and memory tradeoffs in the context of security and
key management.
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A novel approach to key management involves the distribution of some k number
of keys on each mote where k is much smaller than the network size [EsG02, CPS03,
DCL04, DDH03, LiN03]. These schemes rely on pre-distribution of key material before
deployment to ensure trust when deployed. These schemes are touched on briefly in the
next section.
2.3.2.1 Shared Key Distribution Schemes
One way to establish trust is to configure each node with a single, shared masterkey during pre-deployment. This key management scheme is easy to deploy and
maintain, however a compromise of a single node results in a compromise of the entire
network. Alternatively, each node is configured with N-1 keys, where N is the number of
nodes in the network. This approach has the nice property of a compromise only
affecting N-1 links in the network. However, it is inefficient since it is unlikely that all
nodes can talk to each other and adding nodes after deployment requires installing keys
on nodes that may be inaccessible.
The third scheme relies on pre-distributing a set of keys, known as a key ring, of
cardinality k on each node and uses random graph theory to ensure graph connectivity.
[EsG02] first proposed this key management scheme for sensor networks. During a setup phase, an offline process generates a key pool, P, consisting of a large number of
unique keys. A key ring is created by randomly selecting k keys without replacement
from P. N key rings are created from the same P, where N is the network size.
Once all the motes are configured with a key ring they begin a shared key
discovery phase. The connectivity of the network is determined by three factors, namely
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the size of the key pool, the key ring, and the expected number of nodes in a motes
neighborhood, i.e. the number of nodes within a motes transmission range. Since it is a
random deployment, the size of the neighborhood is determined via graph theory, which
uses the area of deployment, transmission range, and network size. For example, a mote
with an infinite transmission range has N-1 neighbors. The memory constraints of the
sensor motes determines the size of the key ring. The network size, deployment area and
transmission range are chosen by the network designers. Thus, two of the three factors in
the scheme proposed by [EsG02] are DSN constraints. However, the size of the key pool
is not a DSN constraint and is scaled to meet the security and connectivity needs of the
network.
[CPS03] expands on the scheme developed by [EsG02] by proposing a qcomposite scheme where q keys must be shared between nodes in order to establish a
link. [DDH03, LiN03] propose two similar, but different, approaches to random predistribution schemes than proposed in [CPS03, EsG02]. [LiN03] uses a polynomialbased key distribution protocol developed for group communication [BSH98] in
combination with the pre-distribution scheme proposed in [EsG02]. [DDH03] uses a
symmetric key generation protocol proposed in [Blo85] combined with [EsG02].
Random key pre-distribution provides a framework for establishing trust without
preexisting infrastructure. In this scheme, trust is delegated to the initialization process
that takes place before deployment. This implicitly assumes that the initialization process
is free from tampering. Also, re-keying, revocation, and adding nodes to the network
requires a certain amount of contingency planning when generating the key pool and key
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rings. [EsG02] provides anecdotal evidence that the size of the key ring increases at a
slower rate than the size of the key pool for a given connectivity constraint. This seems
to indicate that key ring storage requirements are not a constraining factor in
implementing this key management scheme despite increased overhead.
2.3.2.2 Public Key Distribution Schemes
Public key cryptography provides a way to distribute keys over an insecure
channel. The algorithms used in public key cryptography are known as asymmetric since
the keys used for encryption and decryption are not the same. [DiH76] first proposed a
key exchange protocol for establishing a shared secret over an insecure channel. The
protocol, known as Diffie-Hellman, is based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP).
DLP is the problem of calculating k for some x = gk given knowledge of x mod m and g.
This problem is presumed difficult and for a large prime m is considered computationally
infeasible as there is no known efficient algorithm [Mal04, DiH76].
Public key cryptography provides a memory efficient way to establish shared
keys in DSNs over insecure channels. There is an additional cost in computation
however. One implementation of Diffie-Hellman on the Mica2 showed decryption
operations, as opposed to encryption operations, would take “tens of minutes” [WKC04].
Since it is an asymmetric algorithm, one operation can take significantly longer than the
other. For this reason, public key cryptography was deemed infeasible on DSNs
[PWS01, EsG02, CPS03, DCL04, DDH03, LiN03].
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2.3.3 Security Protocols in Distributed Sensor Networks
The following sections examine three security protocols in detail. These
protocols are chosen to provide background and insight into the potential for SNS.
2.3.3.1 SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks
Some of the earliest work done in sensor network security focused on the
feasibility of security on the resource constrained networks [PSW01]. As a proof of
concept, SPINS was developed and implemented on UC Berkley’s “Smart Dust” nodes
using the TinyOS operating system. Although the nodes themselves were quite typical of
a resource constrained node in a sensor network, the network itself consisted of a
relatively small number of nodes.
The security goals set in [PSW01] included data confidentiality, authentication,
integrity, and freshness. Two security building blocks developed by Perrig, et. al. helped
accomplish these goals. The Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) provided twoparty data confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and freshness. The micro version of
the Timed, Efficient, Streaming, Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol referred
to in [PSW01] as μTESLA provided authenticated broadcast.
Among their greatest contribution was SNEP (Secure Network Encryption
Protocol). SNEP provided semantic security, data authentication, replay protection, and
weak freshness. These are all important security properties. More importantly, SNEP
introduced very little additional overhead in communication cost. Transmission in sensor
networks happens to be the most expensive operation in the context of power
consumption [HSW00, SHC04].
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Since the writing of the SPINS paper there has been a concerted effort to add
security to deployed sensor networks. However, one of the greatest weaknesses of the
SPINS paper was the key distribution scheme. It requires that each node maintain a
single, shared master-key. In [PSW04], one of the authors recognized that a secure,
efficient key management scheme for DSNs is critical for SNS. The sharing of a single,
shared master key is undesirable since it violates two security principles, namely the
principles of least privilege and least common mechanism. The principle of least
privilege states that “a subject should only be given the privileges it needs in order to
complete its task” [Bis03:343]. If SPINS adhered to this principle, a node would only
maintain shared-keys for active communication links with its neighbors. There are
practical limitations in sensor networks to consider when trying to adhere to this
principle. The establishment of a secret key between two nodes in a network incurs a
certain amount of overhead in computation and the number of transmissions. However,
the principle of least common mechanism is more feasible. It states that “mechanisms
used to access resources should not be shared” [Bis03:348]. In SPINS a master key is
shared by all nodes to derive shared keys for node-to-node communication. If a single
node is compromised then the entire network becomes vulnerable to eavesdropping. As
discussed in Section 2.3.2, this is undesirable and ultimately avoidable.
An important factor when considering encrypting messages in DSNs is how the
encryption algorithms change the size of the original message. The implementation of
SNEP consists of the RC5 block cipher in counter (CTR) mode. Since the CTR mode is
used, the ciphertext has the same length as the plaintext. In addition, the same function
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can be used for encryption and decryption. Both of these properties are desirable in
sensor networks because they save on memory in terms of code space and message
length. Since the ciphertext is the same length as the plaintext there is no additional cost
in transmission time. Another benefit that the CTR mode provides is weak data
freshness. The counter is incremented after each message the sender transmits and
therefore the receiver can verify that the received packets have a monotonically
increasing counter.
RC5 is subject to a differential cryptanalysis from a chosen plaintext attack
[KaY98], but this attack requires approximately 244 plaintext-ciphertext pairs for a
successful attack. It seems unlikely that even a large sensor network will generate this
much traffic. For example, a network consisting of 10,000 nodes with each node
generating an average of 51 encrypted messages per hour operating continuously for a
year manages less than 233 messages. A well-publicized application for habitat
monitoring [MPS02, SPM04, SOP04] used a sampling rate of once every 70 seconds,
which is approximately 51 samples an hour. The above calculation assumes errorless
communication, doesn’t factor the computation time for encryption, and assumes a mote
can actually operate for a year. Thus, 233 messages is an upper bound, or in the context
of an attack a best-case scenario, and RC5 appears to be a good choice for SNS protocols.
The implementation of SNEP also provided message authentication via a message
authentication code (MAC) that used the same block cipher as the encryption algorithm.
For each packet sent over the channel a MAC is computed that not only provided
authentication, but data integrity as well. Strong freshness is achieved through the
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generation of a random nonce that is sent out with a request message. The reply message
includes the nonce in the MAC computation, which allows the node to know that the
response was generated in reply to its request.
The authors of [PSW01] saw the need for authenticated broadcast to support
node-to-node key agreement and secure, authenticated routing. To that end, they
introduced μTESLA, the micro version of the Timed, Efficient, Streaming, Loss-tolerant
Authentication (TESLA) protocol. The TESLA protocol [PTS00] is not specifically
designed for sensor networks and has a number of shortcomings in this context.
However, μTESLA was designed to overcome these shortcomings by reducing the
requirements of TESLA. It removes digital signatures from initial packets and instead
relies on symmetric mechanisms and a shared master key. Key disclosures in each
packet are also removed and the number of authenticated senders is restricted thereby
reducing the key storage requirements for each mote.
μTESLA uses the concept of a key chain to provide message authentication. The
protocol generates the key chain by randomly choosing the last key in the chain, Kn, that
is then supplied to a one-way hash function, F, to generate K1 through Kn-1 such that Ki =
F(Ki+1). The keys of the key chain are used in a sequential fashion to create a MAC for a
message. This key is later released to provide authentication to nodes that receive the
message. μTESLA requires that each receiver must have one authentic key of the oneway key chain, be loosely time synchronized to the sender, and know the key disclosure
schedule of the sender. In this way a node can authenticate messages upon addition to
the network [PSW01].
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Figure 2 illustrates an example of μTESLA. Each hash on the timeline represents
one time interval. At each interval, the sender uses a new key to generate a MAC for
each packet that is broadcast. The packets are represented by P1, P2, etc. The receiver is
assumed to know K0 through some authenticated channel. The key release schedule is
arbitrary, but assume it is two time intervals for this example. Packets P1 and P2 are
broadcast with a MAC using K1. Packet P3 is broadcast with a MAC using K2. At this
point, the receiver cannot authenticate any packets. At time interval four, the sender
broadcasts K1, which for illustrative purposes is lost. In the fifth interval, K2 is broadcast,
which can be verified by checking K0 = F( F( K2 ) ). Thus, P3 can be authenticated. In
addition, the receiver knows K1 = F( K2 ) [PWS01].

Time
Interval

1

2

3

4

5

Figure 2. A Time-Release Key Chain for Source Authentication [PSW01]

2.3.3.2 TinySec
TinySec is a fully implemented link layer security architecture for wireless sensor
networks [KSW04]. It could be considered the second generation security architecture
for wireless sensor networks after SPINS. It is incorporated in the current version of
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TinyOS and provides security, performance and ease of use in sensor network
applications. The security services of TinySec provide authentication and encryption
(TinySec-AE) and authentication only (TinySec-Auth).
Encryption is provided with the RC5 or Skipjack block ciphers using cipher block
chaining (CBC) mode. CBC mode typically requires an initialization vector (IV) that is
combined with the plaintext to create a pseudorandom bit sequence. For this to work
correctly, the IV must not be reused, which means it must be long enough to guarantee
that it not be reused. The authors of [KSW04] chose to accept the risk of IV reuse and
compensate for this by choosing block ciphers that are robust in the presence of repeated
IVs. Authentication is provided using a MAC that is computed and verified using cipher
block chaining.
2.3.3.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography and EccM 2.0
Elliptic curve cryptography uses elliptic curves in conjunction with the discrete
logarithm problem (DLP) to implement a public key cryptosystem. This system was first
described in [Mil86]. Elliptic Curve DLP (ECDLP) is concerned with the problem of
finding k given P=kG and G, where P is the public key and G is the base point on the
elliptic curve, which is in the public domain. Based on the mathematics of elliptic curves
it is assumed difficult to calculate k and is associated with the same set of problems
concerning the factorization of large integers.
The main advantage of ECDLP over traditional public key cryptosystems is that
they allow for smaller keys sizes for equivalent security. The United States National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) outlines this equivalency in [BBB05].
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Table 1 describes the key size equivalencies. The left column describes a level of
security in which the best known attack is an exhaustive search. Algorithms for factoring
numbers and general discrete logarithm attacks determine the equivalency presented in
the other columns. For example, to provide 80 bits of security, the RSA public key
algorithm must use a key size of 1024 bits. RSA is a public key cryptosystem first
described in [RSA78] and is based on the DLP described in [DiH76]. Alternatively, for
an implementation of ECDLP, only a key size of 160 bits is required for 80 bits of
Table 1. Key Size Equivalencies for Desired Bits of Security
Bits of Security RSA Elliptic Curves
80
1024
160
112
2048
224
128
3072
256
256
16360
512

security. In other words, the current mathematical tools and theories available to solve
the similar, yet different mathematical problems of DLP and ECDLP results in
significantly smaller key sizes for elliptic curve cryptosystems.
EccM is the module name within TinyOS for an implementation of ECDLP on
the Mica2 platform [Mal04, MWS04]. EccM 2.0 provides public key encryption and
decryption for DSNs at a reasonable cost in terms of computation and memory. The
generation of a public-private key pair requires approximately 34 seconds. With
knowledge of a mote’s public key, it takes approximately 34 seconds to generate a shared
secret. The latest version of EccM 2.0 requires 35,401 bytes of total memory upon
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installation. Running stack size reached a maximum of 81 bytes [MWS04]. The key size
is 163 bits, thus providing about 80 bits of security according to Table 1.
2.4 Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis is the analysis and deciphering of cryptographic messages or
systems. Modern cryptography makes the deciphering of cryptographic messages
computationally infeasible. A cryptanalyst attacks such a system by looking for
weaknesses in the protocols. Examples of potential vulnerabilities include key exchange
protocols, software bugs, and human error.
Attacks are categorized according to the type of attack performed against the
cryptosystem. Almost all attacks assume that the cryptographic algorithm is known a
priori. A ciphertext only attack uses knowledge of only the ciphertext to decrypt the
message. This type of attack is usually considered the most difficult to perform [Wag03].
A known plaintext attack uses knowledge of both the plaintext and ciphertext to gain
knowledge of the key. This type of attack is typically used in an exhaustive search for
the key. The attacker usually has a plaintext message and the corresponding ciphertext
produced by the cryptosystem. The attacker systematically encrypts the plaintext with a
key from the key space to produce a ciphertext. The two ciphertexts are compared and if
a match is found then the key is discovered. A chosen plaintext attack requires the
attacker to have access to the cryptosystem and thus provide a plaintext of his choice for
enciphering. This type of attack exploits cryptosystems that produce patterns in
ciphertext messages from similar plaintext messages. A chosen ciphertext attack is the
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same as a chosen plaintext attack, except that the attacker can chose to decipher specified
ciphertext messages.
All cryptographic functions are susceptible to a brute-force attack. A brute-force
attack systematically searches the key space for the appropriate key. This type of attack
is synonymous with an exhaustive search of the key space as described in the previous
section. The expected time to find the key is given in equation 1, where t is the time to
encrypt a plaintext and n is the size of the key space. To thwart this attack,

½tn

(1)

cryptosystems use astronomically large key spaces. The large key space makes it
computationally infeasible for an attacker to try all the keys in a reasonable amount of
time. However, with the advent of the Internet and distributed computing, processing
power is proving to be less of a barrier then previously thought. A widely publicized
attack on the Data Encryption Standard (DES) cipher [NBS99], a symmetric key cipher
with a 56-bit key, took advantage of distributed computing and the Internet to compute
245 billion keys per second [Nel99] and crack the encryption in a little over 22 hours.
2.5 Random Number Generation
Random number generation has a rich history of success followed by failure.
Many attempts at designing random number generators end in failure because they do not
pass statistical tests of randomness. Indeed randomness is a subjective concept in and of
itself. While a sequence of numbers may pass one test for randomness it may not pass
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another. Consequently, it is important to understand the requirements of the system using
the random numbers and know exactly how they will be used.
For all intents and purposes, a random sequence is defined for a given set of
elements as each element having an independent and equal probability of being chosen as
the next element in the sequence. This phenomenon is best illustrated with the flip of a
coin. Each flip holds the potential of turning up heads or tails and is independent of all
previous flips. Due to this definition, computers, as they are now known, will never be
able to produce random sequences. Algorithms attempting to produce sequences that
have the statistical properties of a random sequence are known as pseudorandom number
generators (PRNGs).
PRNGs require a seed that determines the starting point from which the PRNG
will begin generating numbers. PRNGs are predictable by definition. Given the current
state of the PRNG the next number can be predicted. Although this flies in the face of a
truly random sequence, the next number generated by the sequence can be statistically
shown to be independent (i.e., unbiased and uncorrelated).
2.5.1 Linear Feedback Shift Registers
Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) are a type a PRNG that generates a
sequence of independent, uniformly distributed sequence of 1’s and 0’s, also known as a
bit-stream. The shift register consists of a bit sequence, bn, …, b0, where n is the length
of the LFSR and bn is the most significant bit. Upon request for the next random bit, the
shift register is shifted one bit to the right and b0 is output. The new bit, bn+1, is
calculated by XORing certain elements of the shift register with b0. The elements of the
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LFSR used in the XOR operation are called the tap sequence. Figure 3 illustrates the
concept of an LFSR. A maximal LFSR is an LFSR that cycles through 2n-1 internal
states before reaching the initial state again. Zero cannot be reached unless it is the initial
state, in which case the LFSR produces nothing but zeros. The tap sequence determines
whether or not a sequence is maximal and is actually a well understood mathematical
problem [Sch96, Sti02]. Thus, a tap sequence can be derived for an arbitrarily chosen n.

b8

b7

b6

b5

b4

b3

b2

b1

Output

Figure 3. Diagram of an 8-bit Linear Feedback Shift Register

LFSR-PRNGs are best used in cryptography as stream ciphers. LFSR-PRNGs
generate a keystream of a length equal to the plaintext from successive calls to the bitgenerating function. Each output bit, i.e., the least-significant bit, is used as the next
element of the keystream. The plaintext is encrypted using the keystream to get the
ciphertext. The encryption operation is usually a simple bit-wise exclusive-or operation.
Due to the popularity and simplicity of LFSR-PRNGs, researchers have
thoroughly studied the randomness of the keystream [Sch96]. Several approaches
combine two or more LFSRs in an effort to conceal the internal state. Additional LFSRs
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complicate the problem, but once the internal state of the LFSR is discovered the next
value of the LFSR-PRNG is predictable.
2.5.2 Linear Congruential Generators
Linear congruential generators (LCGs) are a class of pseudorandom number
generators taking the form of si +1 = (asi + c) mod m [PaM88, Sch96]. A seed, s0, is
supplied and variables a, c, and m are chosen appropriately. If a, c, and m are chosen
with some care, the LCG produces a maximum sequence with a period m. A common
form of this LCG selects c = 0 and is known as a multiplicative linear congruential
generator (MLCG). In this form, if a and s0 are relatively prime to m, then a maximum
sequence is generated. For this reason, m is often prime, thus ensuring that a and s0 are
relatively prime to m.
All that remains for an MLCG to produce a statistically random sequence is the
proper choice of m and a. Countless studies have shown that m = 231-1 and a = 16807
withstand both empirical and theoretical tests for randomness [PaM88]. Unfortunately,
this PRNG does not provide a cryptographically secure source of random numbers either.
2.5.3 Cryptographically Secure PRNGs
Cryptographically Secure PRNGs (CS-PRNG) aspire to produce random number
sequences that withstand cryptanalysis. As the name suggests, this class of PRNGs are
suitable for use in key generation algorithms. They provide a level of unpredictability
when some or all of its secrets are known.
CS-PRNGs often require certain prerequisites in order to remain secure. For
instance, a common prerequisite is that the seed remain secret. This is usually achieved
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by creating a seed from a true random source. Random sources in modern computers
include packet interarrival times, keyboard latency, and white noise from radio receivers
[Sch96]. While all of these sources are adequate, special care must be taken when
altering these numbers for use in cryptographic primitives. A level of post-processing to
distill any bias or nonrandomness is usually required. Of greatest importance in this
discussion of random sources is that the bits cannot be reproduced.
2.6 Summary
This concludes the background discussion. This chapter introduces the terms and
concepts necessary for an understanding of the following chapters of this work. Of
particular importance to the reader are the sections discussing EccM 2.0 and
pseudorandom number generators, Sections 2.3.3.3 and 2.5 respectively. Equation 1
from Section 2.4 is also of importance and referred to frequently throughout the rest of
this work.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Problem Definition
Given the current state of SNS, it seems likely that a fast, power-efficient, and
secure method for generating random numbers in sensor networks is an immediate need.
Most key management schemes completely side-step the problem of generating keys on
the mote, as is the case in the pre-distribution of secret keys. Others, such as EccM 2.0
use questionable methods for generating keys. The following chapter defines goals and
hypotheses related to random number generation in sensor networks and its impact on
key generation. It also presents a methodology for achieving these goals.
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis
The weakness of the key generation algorithm of EccM 2.0 is known [MWS04].
However, a metric measuring the extent of this weakness is unavailable. EccM 2.0 relies
on the underlying operating system, TinyOS, and its PRNG module called RandomLFSR,
for generating private keys. RandomLFSR is based on an LFSR design for generating
random sequences and is seeded with the mote’s ID, which is a 16-bit unsigned integer.
The mote ID is also used as the network address and therefore is sent in the packet
header. This fact makes the exact random sequence a mote generates discoverable
simply by observing network traffic. Since RandomLFSR is based upon a 16-bit
algorithm there is a maximum bound on the period of 216-1. A pilot study performed on
RandomLFSR generating all possible sequences shows the period to be about ½ of this
maximum in the best case. [MWS04] specifically states EccM 2.0’s “reliance on
TinyOS’s RandomLFSR module is troubling cryptographically”. How the reliance on
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this PRNG affects the security and strength of the underlying cryptographic primitives of
EccM 2.0 is the subject of this thesis. It is hypothesized that the encryption is breakable
using a brute-force attack given a mote ID and public key. Specific questions to be
answered include:
1. Can the weaknesses of the LFSR-PRNG in TinyOS be exploited to break the
public key cryptography of EccM 2.0 and, if so, how fast can it be done?
2. Will the rate of key compromise exceed the motes capacity to rekey?
Another goal is to propose a fast, power-efficient, and secure PRNG that defeats
the brute-force attack described in this thesis. Secondary to this goal is to propose a
PRNG to replace the current RandomLFSR module. Many of the system functions in
TinyOS rely on RandomLFSR to behave in a certain manner. It may even be the case
that specific applications are tuned to perform optimally with RandomLFSR’s quirky
behavior, such as radio interrupt handlers that determine backoff. System performance
aside, cryptographic protocols must have numbers that meet requirements of CS-PRNGs
regardless of the time to produce them. These requirements for a PRNG on TinyOS
represent an apparent dichotomy. RandomLFSR does not allow for this distinction. An
objective of the stated goal is to create a parameterized PRNG. This will allow for a
PRNG initialized to the same starting conditions as RandomLFSR to perform comparably
in terms of execution time, CPU cycles and resource requirements. If the proposed
PRNG is implemented, it must not negatively affect the current system functions relying
on RandomLFSR. Many candidate PRNGs exist including modifying the current LFSR
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design to be a maximal LFSR PRNG. It is not the objective of this work to create a novel
PRNG, but instead base the proposed PRNG off a well known PRNG algorithm.
3.1.2 Approach
To break the public key encryption of EccM 2.0, a network of three or more
motes randomly sends encrypted messages amongst each other. A malicious mote
connected to a laptop promiscuously monitors the network transmissions and relays the
captured traffic to a packet analyzer on the laptop. The laptop identifies packet headers
and captures the mote IDs of the network. Since the motes use public key encryption, the
motes send the keys in the clear, which the malicious mote also captures. Once the
laptop identifies a mote’s ID and its public key it executes a brute-force attack to find the
corresponding private key. This is a modified known plaintext attack, except that in this
case, the brute-force attack systematically creates a private key and performs the same
computation as EccM 2.0 to produce the public key. If the keys match, then the private
key is discovered. Theoretically, this attack is possible on any cryptographic system, but
is normally infeasible due to the size of the key space that must be tested. EccM 2.0 uses
a 163-bit key, but generates these keys with a 16-bit LFSR that has a theoretical
maximum period of 216-1. Thus the key space is significantly reduced and vulnerable to
a brute-force attack.
The current implementation of the LFSR-PRNG is analyzed for areas of
improvement. The PRNG could be seeded with a random number either captured from
the environment or created upon mote configuration. In addition, the selection of taps for
the LFSR is examined in order to create a maximal LFSR. Added flexibility is
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considered for system processes that require fast random number generation at the cost of
a lower quality random number. Alternatively, applications that require high quality
random number sequences need to be able to specify this when requesting a random
number from the PRNG. Research literature documents feasible alternatives to the LFSR
method of generating random numbers that have been proven to be cryptographically
secure, but these algorithms may be too resource intensive for sensor network motes.
3.1.3 Assumptions and Limitations
Unfortunately, like many other applications built for TinyOS, EccM 2.0 is still in
its infancy. Before EccM 2.0 was developed it was held as common sense that public key
systems were too expensive for DSNs. EccM 2.0 was developed to prove that assertion
wrong. However, there still remains much to be done. Section 5.3 discusses this in
further detail, but suffice it to say EccM 2.0 works as a proof-of-concept. It is meant to
work with two motes only and simply broadcasts key messages without any other
information. The receiver simply assumes the received key message is from the other
mote and begins its calculations for generating the shared secret. Although EccM 2.0 is
not fully implemented, it can be reasonably assumed that in a network of three or more
motes, a receiver must be able to associate the broadcast of a public key with a mote in
the network. It follows that the sender would include its network address within the
broadcasted key message. This is critical to the brute-force attack presented in this thesis
because it uses knowledge of the mote ID to reduce the key space of EccM 2.0.
Actual measurement of the execution times for the alternatives may be impossible
to document when using the system clock of the Mica2 due to its resolution; the smallest
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measurable increment is the millisecond. The Mica2 is clocked at 8 million cycles per
second. In order to measure any difference in execution times, the PRNGs must differ by
roughly 8000 cycles. Unfortunately, at first glance, the RandomLFSR appears too
simplistic to require anywhere near this amount of cycles. However, due to its simplicity
a static analysis of the number of cycles required to execute the PRNG function may be
possible. This provides a much more accurate measurement of the difference between
the alternatives.
3.2 System Boundaries
Since Section 3.1.1 identifies two goals, there are two Systems Under Test. The
first system is called the Encryption Breaking System (EBS). The second system is
called the PRNG Performance System (PPS). In the following discussion of system
boundaries and throughout the rest of this thesis, the concept of rekeying is used
frequently. In the scope of this thesis, a rekey operation is defined as a private-public key
operation in EccM 2.0 in response to a request to communicate with a mote in which a
shared key in an active state does not exist. Key states are formally defined in [BBB05],
however only the active and deactivated states are necessary for this thesis. The active
state of a key is the point in a keys lifecycle in which it may protect information, i.e.,
perform encryption, and process protected information, i.e., perform decryption. A key
in the active state transitions to the deactivated state after a predetermined time period has
expired and can only process protected information. The time period that a key in EccM
2.0 remains in an active is defined as the rekey period.
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3.2.1 The Encryption Breaking System
This system consists of the laptop running the encryption breaking program
(EBP). The Component Under Test is the encryption breaking program (EBP). Figure 4
illustrates the system. This SUT addresses the first question stated in Section 3.1. The
second question requires a metric for the power cost of generating a private-public pair in
EccM 2.0. According to [MWS04] this is approximately 0.00549 Joules for the private
key operation and 0.816 Joules for the corresponding public key operation.
It is assumed that a private-public keying operation is only done in response to a
request from a neighboring node to communicate securely. This is a safe assumption
since it is a waste of time and energy to automatically rekey once the freshness of the
current key expires. This assumption implies that with every rekey operation, a shared
secret must also be generated. While no energy cost for computing a shared secret is
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Figure 4. The Encryption Breaking System
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supplied in [MWS04] the average time to compute the shared secret is included, which
turns out to be 34.173 seconds. Similar times for private and public key operations are
provided and they are 0.229 seconds. and 34.161 seconds, respectively. This gives a total
running time of 68.563 seconds. If one rekey operation is performed each hour, it would
result in a 1.9% duty cycle by the following calculation.
seconds
hour ×100 = 1.904%
seconds
3600
hour

68.563

3.2.2 The PRNG Performance System
This system consists of a Mica2 mote with the current RandomLFSR module and
the proposed PRNGs installed on the OS. The Components Under Test are the proposed
PRNGs. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
3.3 System Services
The EBS offers one service, which is a modified known plaintext attack on the
EccM 2.0 key generation algorithm. The service has two possible outcomes, either
success or failure. Success is indicated by the successful match of the given public key
with the key generated by the EBP. The primary metrics are the time to find the key, the
number of keys tried before a successful decryption, and the private key. Failure occurs
if the key space is exhausted without finding a key that successfully matches the given
public key. Failure can also occur if the key space is large enough to effectively thwart a
brute force attack. While failure in this context is fundamentally subjective, the expected
time to compromise a private key and the duty cycle provide a way to formally define
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Figure 5. The PRNG Performance System

this concept. Requiring a mote running EccM 2.0 to rekey once an hour requires a 1.9%
duty cycle. Requiring the mote to rekey twice an hour requires a 3.8% duty cycle.
Alternatively, requiring a rekey once every two hours requires a 0.95% duty cycle. Thus,
the expected rate of compromise is directly related to the duty cycle required for a rekey.
This is defined in equation 2, where r is the rate of private-public key operations per hour
on the laptop, n is the size of the key space, and D is duty cycle. See Appendix A for the
derivation of this equation.

2r
*1.9 = D
n

(2)

Selecting D and measuring r results in a lower bound for n, which precisely
defines how large the key space must be to thwart a brute-force attack for a desired duty
cycle. Selecting D is subjective, but for the purposes of this thesis, a lower bound on the
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duty cycle of 0.1% is not unreasonable. Thus, if the size of the key space results in a duty
cycle less than 0.1% the system fails.
The PPS offers one service, the generation of random values of a specified
number of bits. The service has two possible outcomes, success or failure. Success is
determined by a successful generation of a random value of sufficient length. Failure
occurs if the PRNG fails to generate a sequence of random values of sufficient length to
thwart a brute-force attack, i.e., the PPS fails if the EBS succeeds.
3.4 Workload

The workload for the EBS is directly related to the number of motes in the
system. The TinyOS architecture and the network are simulated and the public key is
generated and fed to the EBP. Two motes communicating across a channel do not
accurately model a computer network because there is no contention for the channel.
This means three is the minimum number of motes needed to form a network. Sensor
networks are envisioned to have thousands of motes deployed in an ad hoc fashion.
However, it is not necessary to scale the workload to this size because an asymptotic
upper bound can be found for N, the number of nodes in the network, based on the
algorithm used in EBP.
The workload for the PPS is a small application running on a Mica2 mote. The
application generates iterative requests to the PRNG modules under test. The application
generates requests until the sequence repeats. The period of the PRNG is reported at this
time. Practically speaking, it is unnecessary to run the application on a Mica2 mote. The
distribution of TinyOS 1.1.x is capable of emulating program behavior on a PC
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[LLW03]. The number of CPU cycles are determined from a static analysis of the
assembly code and likewise the memory requirements are determined from counting the
bytes required for each instruction.
3.5 Performance Metrics

The main performance metrics for the EBS are the amount of time the system
takes for a success and the number of keys tried before success. These metrics provide a
measure of the feasibility of the EBS. If the EBS takes longer to break the encryption
than the motes capacity to generate new keys, the current method for creating random
numbers may be considered strong enough. This is unlikely given the size of the key
space.
The main performance metrics for the PPS are the time to generate a random
value and the memory requirements of the PRNG. The execution time is directly related
to CPU cycles on the Mica2 mote and is a sound metric for determining power
consumption due to CPU computation. In addition, program memory is at a premium on
the Mica2 and should be considered for any application that runs on the Mica2.
Another important factor when considering PRNGs is the randomness of the
output and the period of the random sequence. The intent of this thesis is to use
published algorithms and verification of these factors is assumed unnecessary.
3.6 Parameters

This section describes the parameters chosen for the two systems under test.
Table 2 identifies the system parameters and workload parameters for each system.
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Table 2. The Parameters for the SUTs Categorized by System and Workload

System
Workload

Systems Under Test
EBS
PPS
Laptop CPU speed
Mote CPU speed
System Processes
Mote memory
Mote energy
Network size
PRNG period
Number of rekeys

3.6.1 The EBS System and Workload Parameters

The rate at which the key space is generated and potential keys are tested is
directly related to the speed of the CPU on the laptop. Since it is a brute force attack, it is
a simple matter of processing power and time. The number of keys to break determines
the workload submitted to the system. This is directly related to the network size.
Another workload parameter that affects performance is the number of rekeys a
mote performs before an ID-key pair is captured and sent to the EBS. The generation of
a private key in EccM 2.0 is an iterative call to the LFSR-PRNG until enough numbers
are generated to create a 163-bit key. If an ID-key pair is captured during the initial
startup of a sensor network, the EBS only has to generate one key before success.
However, if an ID-key pair is captured at an unknown time after deployment it is
impossible to know how many calls to the LFSR-PRNG have been made.
Finally, during the pilot study, mote IDs generated random sequences of varying
length. The maximum period observed is 31,796, which is about half the theoretical
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maximum. The minimum period consists of only one random value. Hence, the seed
used for RandomLFSR affects the period of the PRNG and consequently the size of the
key space. This behavior of RandomLFSR will be examined in-depth to identify
particularly weak seeds (i.e., mote IDs).
3.6.2 The PPS System and Workload Parameters

The execution time of a request for a random value is directly related to the CPU
speed of the mote. The number of requests that can be made is ultimately constrained by
the mote’s power capacity. Finally, if the results need to be saved, the maximum number
of random values stored is limited by the mote’s memory capacity and the size of the
value. The size of the value requested varies according to the workload submitted to the
system.
3.7 Factors

This section identifies the factors chosen for experimentation. Table 3 identifies
these factors and their respective levels.

Table 3. Factors and the Levels for the Systems Under Test

network size
# of rekeys

EBS
3, 6, 9, 27
0, random

PPS
none

The main purpose of the EBS is to demonstrate that applications that rely on the
TinyOS LFSR-PRNG are vulnerable to exploitation; no system parameters identified in
the EBS will be varied. The network size and number of rekeys are varied to measure
system response. It is standard practice for motes to be assigned IDs starting at 0 and
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counting up sequentially during configuration. This same practice is used when
assigning mote IDs in the EBS and is not varied in order to reduce the number of
experiments. The EBS is expected to perform closely to equation 1, the expected time of
a brute-force attack. The key space of a network of motes is simply the summation of
each individual mote’s key space. To verify this, network sizes of 3, 6, 9 and 27 are
selected as levels for experimentation.
The sequence produced by RandomLFSR for a given mote ID can be viewed as a
cyclical group. The number of rekeys corresponds to an element of this group. For
example, zero rekeys corresponds to the first element of the cycle. An arbitrary number
of rekeys, x, corresponds to the x mod n element of the group, where n is length of the
sequence, i.e., the number of elements in the group. To generate a private key in EccM
2.0, 11 calls are made to the LFSR-PRNG to generate enough bits for a 163-bit key.
Since the RandomLFSR module is initialized by EccM 2.0, only it may call the LFSRPRNG, preventing random permutations of the sequence. This could allow calculation of
the position in the sequence given the number of rekeys. However, no reasonable way to
attain this information seems available. Therefore, simulation of an attacker at network
deployment and at an arbitrary time after deployment are only considered. To simulate
an attacker at network startup the first key in the sequence is fed to the EBS. To simulate
an arbitrary number of rekeys, elements of the sequence are chosen randomly using a
uniformly distributed random number generator.
The Mica2 and TinyOS are popular platform choices for sensor networks.
Therefore, the CPU speed, memory size, and energy parameters are not considered
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variables for this system. The period of the PRNG determines its ability to thwart a brute
force attack. However, the period of each alternative is dependent upon its design and
cannot be modified.
3.8 Evaluation Technique

The performance evaluation for both systems is done via measurements of real
systems. The EBS uses simulation to generate the workload, but the EBP is implemented
in Java on a laptop. The laptop contains a 2 GHz AMD Athlon 64 Processor 3200+ with
512 MB RAM. The operating system is Microsoft Windows XP, Home Edition with
Service Pack 2 installed. All non-critical system services are stopped and the only
running applications are the the Windows Task Manager and a command prompt. The
EBS uses the Java Random class as its PRNG for selecting random keys from the key
space of each mote. The seed for the simulation is arbitrarily chosen as
1030785277711181.
In theory, the PPS is implemented on a Mica2 mote. However, as discussed in
Section 3.1.3 individual requests to the PPS are impossible to measure in software with
the system clock. TinyOS version 1.1 is used as it is the most strenuously tested. The
code is compiled for the Mica2 and a static analysis of the disassembled code is
performed to determine the number of instructions used and cycles required for
execution. The disassembled code is produced with avr-objdump, a disassembler
included with the distribution of TinyOS 1.1. Finally, a cycle count is determined from
the ATMega128L datasheet [Atm04].
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Another important metric of the PPS is the randomness and period of the
proposed PRNGs. Many statistical tests exist to test randomness. These tests will be
applied if the randomness of the algorithm is in question. Additionally, the period of
most PRNGs can be verified empirically by generating the full sequence. Certain
PRNGs, specifically CS-PRNGs, are specifically designed to make it computationally
infeasible to generate the full sequence. These must be verified with a mathematical
proof, but since it is not the aim of this thesis to create such an algorithm, this type of
verification should not be needed.
3.9 Experimental Design

The EBS is designed to demonstrate the weakness of the RandomLFSR module,
and there is no comparison being performed. Therefore the experiment is
straightforward. Eight experiments are run to obtain a full factorial test of the time to
break the encryption. As shown in Table 3, one factor of two levels and one factor of
four levels are chosen for the EBS. Thus, two times four equals eight experiments. Each
experiment for a given network size using a random number of rekeys is replicated 20
times totaling 80 experiments (1 * 4 * 20 = 80). When using zero re-keys each network
size level is deterministic and thus each experiment only needs to be executed once. A
total of 84 experiments are run to profile the performance of the EBS.
The PPS is designed to measure the performance of the enhanced PRNG
compared to the LFSR-PRNG. The PPS is analyzed analytically requiring no
experiments to be run.
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3.10 Analysis and Interpretation of Results

The execution time for the EBS is averaged over the replications for each
experiment. These are plotted on a graph and visually verified for linearity. The key
space of each network size tested by the EBS does not proceed in a linear manner. That
is to say, a network of size 6 does not contain twice as many keys as a network of size 3.
This is due to the sub-maximal performance of RandomLFSR. However, the expected
time for each network can be obtained by knowing t, the time to compute a private-public
key pair. The value t is determined empirically via repeated measurements of a single
private-public key computation on the target laptop. Each network size level forms its
own category and the average of each category is calculated to verify that it is in the
range of the expected value of ½tn with 90% confidence.
The PPS is an attempt to provide TinyOS with an alternative to the LFSR-PRNG.
Metrics are obtained on its performance to give implementers an idea of the costs
associated with the proposed PRNG. In addition, the randomness and period of the
proposed PRNGs are presented and discussed.
3.11 Summary

Chapter III presented the experimental methodology for key generation in sensor
networks. Goals and objectives are stated and assumptions and limitations are discussed.
Section 3.1 states the objective of breaking EccM 2.0 with a brute-force attack. As a
means to this end, this work must determine the average time to perform a private-public
key operation on the experimental laptop. Section 3.1 also states the objective of
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proposing an alternative to RandomLFSR at a similar cost in terms of execution time and
memory requirements.
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IV. Analysis and Results
4.1 Encryption Breaking System

The following subsections discuss the procedures used to discover the weaknesses
in RandomLFSR and consequently EccM 2.0. They also discuss the EBS design,
implementation, and performance. An analysis and interpretation of the results is
presented alongside the discussion of the EBS performance.
4.1.1 RandomLFSR Analysis

The LFSR-PRNG of TinyOS, hereafter called RandomLFSR, was never designed
to provide security primitives with random numbers. It is initialized with the mote’s
TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS constant, which is assigned during configuration and program
upload. This constant is the mote’s network address and is used when routing traffic
through the WSN. Thus it can be discovered simply by monitoring the packets generated
by the mote.
TinyOS 1.1.0, and consequently RandomLFSR, are written in the nesC language
[GLB03]. In order to implement the EBS, it was necessary to port the code to Java. The
port also made it easier to quickly examine the sequence for any given seed and analyze
the behavior of RandomLFSR. As mentioned, the mote ID also acts as the seed for
RandomLFSR. The mote ID is a 16-bit unsigned integer and in theory can range from 0216-1. However, in actual operation certain network addresses should not be used, such
as 65535, or 0xFFFF in hexadecimal, and 126, or 0x007E in hexadecimal. These values
represent the network broadcast address and Universal Asynchronous
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Receiver/Transmitter (UART) address. This turns out to be irrelevant since there are no
arbitrary restrictions on the seed to RandomLFSR, not even a seed of zero.
[Lev04] described the odd behavior of RandomLFSR, but did not go into details.
To better understand RandomLFSR, the random number sequence was generated for the
full range of possible seeds. Table 4 illustrates the various sequence lengths for different
seeds. The first column lists the various sequence lengths produced by RandomLFSR,
the second column lists the number of seeds that generate a sequence of the given length,
and the last column lists the percentage of the total possible seed values (216). Most
notable is that while none of the mote IDs produces a maximal sequence, some IDs
produce sequences shorter than others.
Another interesting behavior is that for seeds in the range 0 thru 216, 31796 of
them produce a sequence of 31796 before repeating, 21159 produce a sequence length of

Table 4. The Various Sequence Lengths Produced by TinyOS 1.1.0’s RandomLFSR
Sequence Length
31796
21159
7471
2492
1110
345
325
301
294
195
12
8
7
6
2
1

# of Seeds
31796
21159
7471
2492
1110
345
325
301
294
195
24
8
7
6
2
1
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Percentage
48.52%
32.29%
11.40%
3.80%
1.69%
0.53%
0.50%
0.46%
0.45%
0.30%
0.04%
0.01%
0.01%
0.01%
0.00%
0.00%

21159, 7471 produce a sequence of length 7471, and so on as is shown in Table 4. The
reason for this behavior is easily understood once it is realized that RandomLFSR creates
cyclical subgroups from set of all 16-bit integer seeds. The seeds generating a sequence
length of 31,796 form a cyclic subgroup of { x | x ∈ ], 0 < x < 65536} . If one of the
elements generating this sequence length is used as a seed, it creates the same random
sequence as any other number in the group. This behavior of RandomLFSR implies that
only 17 unique sequences are ever generated. This follows from the 16 rows in Table 4
plus one row (sequence length 12) has two subgroups generating the same sequence
length, thus 16+1=17. One minor detail in the code of the LFSR prevents this fact from
being exploited. A numerical mask that is different for each seed is used to alter the
output of RandomLFSR. The mask is calculated from the initial seed by the formula

mask = 137 * 29*(TOS _ LOCAL _ ADDRESS + 1) . Documentation for why the mask is
calculated in this manner could not be found, especially why the multipliers of 137 and
29 were chosen. This mask is applied by XORing the mask with the output of
RandomLFSR before the output is returned to the caller. Therefore, while the underlying
sequences generated by each group are the same, the sequence generated for each seed is
not. This does not affect the distribution of RandomLFSR as shown in Figure 6, which
shows the distribution of the sequence of numbers generated by a seed of zero.
4.1.2 EccM 2.0 Analysis

EccM 2.0 represents large integers using a byte array to hold the bits of the
integer. This representation is commonly known as a “big integer” or bigints. For
example, to represent 2163 using a byte array requires an array length of 21. Thus, the
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Figure 6. A Typical Distribution of the Numbers Produced by RandomLFSR

right-most element of the array represents the 8 least significant bits of the big integer.
The left-most element (indexed at 0) represents the 8 most significant bits. EccM 2.0
actually uses an array of length 42 to handle overflow as the number is manipulated by
the elliptic curve algorithms. Figure 7 shows the section of code used to generate the
private key. The function b_mod is function used by the author of EccM 2.0 to perform
modular arithmetic on bigints. It takes to two byte arrays representing bigints and the bit
length of the bigints, uses the second bigint argument as the modulus, and places the
result in the first bigint argument.
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// privKeyA.s = random number in [0, 2^p);
for (i = NUMWORDS/2; i < NUMWORDS; i++)
privKeyA.s[i] = (word_t) call Random.rand();
// privKeyA.s = privKeyA.s (mod params.r)
b_mod(privKeyA.s, params.r, NUMWORDS/2);

Figure 7. EccM 2.0 Algorithm for Generating the Private Key

It is the intention of this section of code to randomly select a number between 0
and r, the order of the elliptic curve, with equal probability. The order of the curve
(params.r in the code) is a 49 digit number and is roughly given as 5.84e48, somewhere
between 2163 and 2162 [Mal04]. However, because of the deficiencies of RandomLFSR it
is known that at most 31,179 numbers can ever be generated in the best case. This is
because the private key is created via repeated calls to the RandomLFSR module. If n is
the length of the sequence and S is the sequence for a given mote, then the first call to
RandomLFSR can be viewed as the starting point of some subsequence in S. There are
only n such subsequences in S and therefore only n private keys will be generated from S.
The author of EccM 2.0 specifically chose a 163-bit key with the intention of
providing 80 bits of security as per the recommendation of the NIST. However, in the
best case, a little less than 15 bits of security (215 = 32768) is provided by EccM 2.0.
This fact leaves EccM 2.0 vulnerable to a brute-force attack. All that is needed to
discover the private key for a given public key is to know the sequence used (i.e. know
the seed).
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4.1.3 Encryption Breaking System

With the RandomLFSR understood and EccM 2.0 exposed, it simply remains to
design a system that faithfully duplicates the steps performed by EccM 2.0 to generate
public keys. The Encryption Breaking System (EBS) is implemented in Java. The EBS
is intended to run on a laptop with a mote connected via the serial port that is listening
indiscriminately to packets transmitted over the air. Tools to forward packets from the
mote to a connected PC are already written in Java and provided with the distribution of
TinyOS 1.1.0, thus Java was a natural choice for the EBS. It is a simple matter to modify
these tools to seamlessly pass packets to the EBS. In order to maintain a controlled
experiment, an offline process generates all public keys used in the experiment and stores
them in a database. When the simulation of EBS runs, a seed and public key are
randomly selected from the database and artificially injected into the EBS. The
encryption breaking program is triggered by the simulation in the same manner that an
overheard packet is forwarded over the serial port. That is to say, they use the same
method call.
The EBS now possesses the two things it needs to discover the private key via a
brute-force attack, namely the mote’s ID and the public key. It is simply a matter of time
before the key is discovered. How much time is of concern because taking too much
time renders the private key useless to the attacker since the mote may have rekeyed. For
example, if it takes several months to discover the private key by trial and error, it is
likely that the mote will have rekeyed itself by then. On the other hand, if the key can be
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discovered in a trivial amount of time, then in order to remain secure, the mote must
rekey itself at least as fast as the average case.
4.1.3.1 The Expected Performance of EBS
In order to verify the execution time of the EBS, the variables of equation 1, must
be known. The key space, n, is easy enough to determine. The key space for each mote
used in the experiment is known because it is simply the period of that motes’
RandomLFSR sequence. However, the time to generate the private-public key pair, t, is
not known. One possible way to determine this value is to measure the time it takes for
the offline process to generate the public keys used within the experiment. The process
stored these keys in text files that can be loaded by the simulation to randomly feed keys
and IDs to the EBS. Table 5 shows that this requires 566,500 iterations. The sequence
length of each of the mote IDs selected for experimentation was measured empirically by
generating the entire sequence. As mentioned in Section 3.7, it is common practice to
address motes in a network starting at 0 and counting up. Therefore, mote IDs 0-26 are
used to obtain the numbers in Table 5. Consequently, 8 mote addresses in the range 0-26
have a sequence length of 31,796, 14 have a length of 21,159, etc. The key space for all

Table 5. Sequence Length of First 27 Sequential Mote IDs
Sequence Length
31796
21159
7471
345
325
294
Total

# of Motes
8
14
2
1
1
1
27
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Total Keys
254,368
296,226
14,942
345
325
294
566,500

27 motes is simply the summation of the right column in Table 5, which is the sequence
length multiplied times the number of motes.
This presented the opportunity to measure the execution time of the laptop when
generating the keys required. On average, the laptop took approximately 97.14 msecs to
compute a public key with a standard deviation of 6.87 and 90% confidence interval of
±0.015 msecs. Appendix B discusses how the average is derived.
The sheer size of the task created additional difficulties. The public keys are
selected “on the fly” while the simulation is running. However, attempting to load the 27
text files containing the public keys causes the JVM to throw an OutOfMemoryError
error due to the average file size of 5.5 MB. Therefore, as the simulation runs, the file for
the target mote is loaded and a public key is randomly selected. This implies that a small
amount of overhead in terms of file loading time is introduced for each mote that would
not be present in the actual system. The average load time for each file is shown in
Figure 8. To put things in perspective, Table 6 shows the expected performance for each
network size and the overhead introduced. Appendix C provides the data for the
numbers used to derive the average load time.
4.1.3.2 Results and Analysis of EBS Performance
To simulate attackers present during a DSN deployment, four experiments on
different network sizes used zero rekeys. If an attacker is present at deployment he will
overhear the first broadcast of any mote in the network. This leaves EccM 2.0 extremely
vulnerable to attack due to its straightforward startup. An attacker simply needs to
generate the first pair of keys in the sequence to find the private key. Table 7 illustrates
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Figure 8. Average Times for Loading Key File for Each Mote

Table 6. Expected Time to Identify a Private Key Versus Average File Load Time
Network
Expected
Average File
Ratio of
Size
Time
Load Time Load/Expected
68 min, 36 sec
6 sec
0.0015
3
137 min, 12 sec
12 sec
0.0015
6
205 min, 48 sec
18 sec
0.0015
9
458
min,
34
sec
41
sec
0.0015
27

the performance of the four experiments. The first column lists the network sizes used in
the experiments and the second column lists the running time to find the private keys of
all the motes in the network. The measured times are higher than the expected time of
about 97 msecs per mote. This is partly explained by the file loading times listed in the
third column of Table 6. However, there is still a significant gap, which is assumed to be
due to program overhead at startup.
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Table 7. Measured Time of the EBS to Identify Private Keys with Zero Rekeys.
Network Size
3
6
9
27

Measurement
(msecs)
7016
13109
19656
44235

In contrast to an attacker being present at DSN deployment, it is possible for
EccM 2.0 to rekey an arbitrary number of times. This means that any key in the key
space could be in use at any given time. To simulate this, a random key is selected from
the key space for each mote and injected into the EBS. The size of the key space for each
network size is dependent upon the mote IDs used for each network. As discussed in
Chapter 3, it is common practice to sequentially number the mote IDs starting at 0. This
results in a key space of 84,751 for 3 motes, 169,502 for 6 motes, 254,253 for 9 motes
and 566,500 for 27 motes. Figure 9 plots the sequence length of each mote ID over the
cumulative key space for a network consisting of the greatest assigned network address.
The x-axis represents the mote ID, the left y-axis is the sequence length of the particular
mote ID, and the right y-axis is the size of the network assuming motes are addressed
sequentially. For example, a network of 3 motes consists of motes addressed 0, 1, and 2.
The key space for this network is the point labeled 2 on the x-axis and is the summation
of the individual mote’s key spaces. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, the key space of a
network is essentially equal to the sequence lengths generated by RandomLFSR, which is
based on the mote’s network address.
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Figure 9. The Correlation of RandomLFSR Sequence Lengths
and Size of the Key Space Assuming Motes are Addressed Sequentially
Table 8 summarizes the results from the experiments for the different sized
networks. The average time in the second column is the measured time from each
experiment averaged over 20 measurements. The expected time in column three is

Table 8. The Average Time for the EBS to Identify All Keys in a Network of a Given
Size Assuming an Arbitrary Number of Rekeys
Network
Standard
Average Time
Expected
% Error
Size
Deviation
74 mins, 36 secs 68 mins, 36 secs
8.82% 24 mins, 42 secs
3
138 mins, 11 secs 136 mins, 12 secs
0.72% 31 mins, 42 secs
6
222 mins, 16 secs 205 mins, 49 secs
8.00% 49 mins, 29 secs
9
455 mins, 3 secs 458 mins, 34 secs
0.77% 138 mins, 34 secs
27
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computed using equation 1, with 97.14 milliseconds as t. The key space, n, is determined
empirically, since it is a simple matter to generate the random sequence for each mote
address. The percent error is the difference of the average measured time and the
expected time divided by the expected time. Figure 10 shows these results graphically
with the error bars giving the 90% confidence interval for each point. The expected time
is plotted for each network size. Obviously it closely resembles the line in Figure 7 since
it is simply the key space multiplied times the constant ½t. Thus, it appears that the
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Figure 10. The Measured Time to Find Private Keys Versus Expected Time

performance of the EBS supports the expected time of 97.14 milliseconds per privatepublic key operation.
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The result of all this is that for 31,796 potential mote IDs, the time that EBS can
discover the private key on average is:
1
1
tn = × 97.14 milliseconds × 31796
2
2
= 1544331.72 milliseconds
or in minutes:
1544331.72 milliseconds
milliseconds
60000
minute
= 25.738862 minutes
=

This means that in order for EccM 2.0 to remain secure, the mote must transition
a private-public key pair to a deactivated state 25 minutes after its initial use. This is at a
minimum; a prudent design would allow the key to remain in an active state at most 15
minutes. Of course, this assumes that only motes with the maximum period are used.
Table 9 shows the expected time to identify a private key for all sequence lengths
generated by RandomLFSR. The times in the second column are computed using
equation 1. The last row groups sequence lengths of 12 or less together and specifies that
it takes 600 milliseconds or less to break sequence lengths of 12 or less. How this affects
the longevity of the WSN is application dependent. For example, assuming the batteries
provide 2200 mAh at 3V and considering that the Mica2 processor requires 8 mA to
operate and that a rekey operation on the Mica2 takes 68.53 seconds, then the Mica2 can
calculate approximately:
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Table 9. The Expected Time of the EBS to Find a Private Key Given a Mote
Producing the Listed Sequence Length
Expected Time to
Identify Private Key
25.74 minutes
17.13 minutes
6.05 minutes
2.02 minutes
53.91 seconds
16.76 seconds
15.79 seconds
14.62 seconds
14.28 seconds
9.47 seconds
< 600 milliseconds

Sequence Length
31796
21159
7471
2492
1110
345
325
301
294
195
12 or less

seconds
hour = 7920000 milliamp-seconds
seconds
milliamp-seconds
8 milliamperes × 68.53
548.24
rekey
rekey

2200 milliamp-hours × 3600

= 14446 rekeys

before exhausting its batteries. Assuming four rekeys per hour allows the Mica2 to last
for about 151 days. Of course, this is the best case scenario and concedes that the Mica2
does nothing else in those 151 days except rekey itself.
In general, it is difficult to estimate the longevity without an application. If the
key is expired every 15 minutes, or four rekeys per hour, the processor would require a
duty cycle of:
seconds
hour × 100 = 7.614%
4×
seconds
3600
hour
68.53
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Of the few applications actually published, most constrain the processor’s duty
cycle to no more than 5.8% [MPS02]. Since the duty cycle required for secure operation
is greater than what is allowed by the application, a compromise must be made
somewhere. For example, it is possible to design a DSN that operates only 15 minutes
every hour. In fact, many designs may already do this in the interest of conserving
power. However, this constraint is an unnecessary burden on a DSN engineer since
better alternatives to RandomLFSR exist in the literature.
4.2 PRNG Performance System

The following subsections discuss alternatives to the RandomLFSR PRNG of
TinyOS. Two alternatives are examined. The first is a maximal LFSR-PRNG adapted
from [Sch96]. The second is a MLCG-PRNG adapted from [PaM88] and distributed
with the beta of TinyOS 2.0. Their performance is analyzed in terms of computation
cycles, memory requirements and sequence lengths. Due to their fundamentally different
design, a direct comparison is inappropriate. However, a system’s view is taken when
analyzing the impact of each PRNG on the performance of EccM 2.0 that clearly shows
the best alternative.
4.2.1 A Maximal Linear Feedback Shift Register

One possible way to overcome the deficiencies of RandomLFSR is to create a
maximal LFSR and seed it with a secret number. The literature is replete with examples
of how to create a maximal LFSR. The linear nature of LFSR-PRNGs however make
this an even weaker PRNG then RandomLFSR. Since the next number of an LFSR, xi+1,
is dependent on the previous number, xi, a random sequence produced for a given
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maximal tap sequence forms a linear chain, x0, x1, x2, …, xn-1, xn, where n is the period of
the LFSR. The result of this behavior is that no matter which value is chosen as the seed
it will always produce the same sequence. All that is needed to break EccM 2.0 in this
case is produce 216-1 public keys. Each mote produces the same set of keys. This set of
keys could be generated off-line and reduce breaking EccM 2.0 to a reverse lookup table.
RandomLFSR avoids this pitfall by creating a mask based on the seed value as
discussed in Section 4.1.1. The same approach can be used for a maximal LFSR and thus
produce 216 unique sequences, where a seed of zero produces the base sequence. The
maximal property of the LFSR is not affected by this modification, which was verified
empirically by generating the sequences for all possible seed values. The code for this
maximal LFSR, hereafter referred to as MaximalLFSR, is shown in Figure 11. The main
body of the function is taken directly from [Sch96] and implemented in the nesC
language. The full code can be viewed in Appendix F. shiftReg is the 16-bit shift
register of MaximalLFSR and is essentially the state of the LFSR. The atomic statement
prevents system interrupts and ensures other tasks cannot alter the state of the
MaximalLFSR. endbit is a Boolean value representing the exclusive-or of the 16th, 5th,
3rd, 2nd, and 1st bits and determines the “feedback” of the LFSR. If endbit evaluates to
true, shiftReg is shifted right by one and a 1 is placed in the left-most bit. If it evaluates
to false, shiftReg is shifted right by one and a 0 is placed in the left-most bit by definition
of the right-shift operation in nesC.
The design is slightly modified from [Sch96] in that instead of outputting a single
bit, the entire state of MaximalLFSR is XORed with initseed, which is simply the initial
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async command uint16_t Random.rand() {
bool endbit;
uint16_t tmpShiftReg;
atomic {
tmpShiftReg = shiftReg;
endbit = ((tmpShiftReg >> 16) ^ (tmpShiftReg >> 5) ^
(tmpShiftReg >> 3) ^ (tmpShiftReg >> 2) ^
(tmpShiftReg)) & 0x0001;
if (endbit)
tmpShiftReg = (tmpShiftReg >> 1) | 0x8000;
else
tmpShiftReg = tmpShiftReg >> 1;
shiftReg = tmpShiftReg;
}
return tmpShiftReg ^ initseed;
}

Figure 11. The MaximalLFSR Function for Generating the Next Random Number

seed of MaximalLFSR, and returned. As discussed in [Sch96], LFSR-PRNGs are
designed to produce random bits. To produce random numbers from LFSR-PRNGs,
[Sch96] suggests repeatedly calling the random function and ORing the bits together to
form the desired length integer. Thus, given that an n-bit number is desired and a n-bit
LFSR is used, the resulting value after n calls is simply the state of the LFSR n calls
prior. Therefore, for a 16-bit PRNG such as MaximalLFSR it seemed logical to simply
return the current state of the LFSR. This approach succeeds at thwarting a brute force
attack because knowledge of the private key cannot be gained from the public key. In
other words, while knowledge of the private key reveals information about the underlying
random sequence, all the cryptanalyst has access to is the public key. Thus, when using
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MaximalLFSR, the EBS must generate 216 * (216-1) * ½ public keys on average to break
the encryption. A successful attack by the EBS would take on average:

(

)

1
milliseconds
× 97.14
× 216 ( 216 − 1) keys = 208,603,378,483.2 milliseconds
2
key
or in years:
208,603,378,483.2 milliseconds
= 6.61 years
3600 second 24 hours 365.25 days
1000 ×
×
×
1 hour
1 day
1 year
However, EBS fails in this case by the definition of failure. Using equation 2 results in a
duty cycle for the Mica2 of:
⎛
milliseconds ⎞
⎜ 3, 600, 000
⎟
hour
⎟
2×⎜
⎜ 97.14 milliseconds ⎟
⎜
⎟
key
⎝
⎠ × 1.9% = 3.27 ×10−5% < 0.1%
16
16
2 ( 2 − 1) keys

Unfortunately, MaximalLFSR does not produce random sequences. While no
statistical tests were run on the output of MaximalLFSR, a cursory analysis shows that
the output is predictable for internal states that are powers of two. For example, suppose
shiftReg equals 214, or 0x4000 in hexadecimal. In this case, endbit evaluates to 0 and the
else branch is executed, which simply left-shifts the value of shiftReg by 1. In other
words, it divides 214 by 2 giving 213, or 0x2000. This pattern continues for 0x1000,
0x0800, 0x0400, 0x0200, and so on, until the internal state becomes 25 and endbit
evaluates to 1. While the exclusive-or operation on the output transforms this sequence,
this pattern is still easily identified. For example, suppose initSeed equals 1, then the
pattern is the same, except that one is added to each element of the sequence. The
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exclusive-or changes the underlying pattern in a consistent, predictable way, which is
readily detected under close inspection. This in turn, reveals the initial seed and allows
the output to be predicted.
4.2.2 TinyOS 2.0’s Multiplicative Linear Congruential Generator

The beta version of TinyOS 2.0 was released in November 2005 [Tin05]. This
release came packaged with two random number generators, the original RandomLFSR
and a new PRNG proposed in [Lev04]. The new PRNG is based upon the Park-Miller
minimum standard proposed in [PaM88] and is a multiplicative linear congruential
generator (MLCG). Researchers extensively tested the output of this MLCG for
randomness [CoM67, FiM86, Hoa76, Knu81] and it is generally accepted to be a good
PRNG [PaM88]. While MLCGs are excellent choices for simulations, they prove to be a
poor choice for cryptographic systems as they are predictable [Sch96]. With that said,
seeding TinyOS 2.0’s MLCG with a secret seed (presumably loaded during
configuration) succeeds at thwarting the attack defined in this thesis because the sequence
generated by the MLCG is maximal with a period of 231-1. For the EBS to successfully
identify the private key would require on average:
1
milliseconds
× 97.14
× ( 231 − 1) keys
2
key
= 3.305 years
milliseconds 3600 second 24 hours 365.25 days
1000
×
×
×
1 second
1 hour
1 day
1 year
RandomMLCG also manages to causes the EBS to fail by only requiring a duty cycle of:
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⎛
milliseconds ⎞
⎜ 3, 600, 000
⎟
hour
⎟
2×⎜
⎜ 97.14 milliseconds ⎟
⎜
⎟
key
⎝
⎠ × 1.9% = 6.56 ×10−5% < 0.1%
31
( 2 − 1) keys

4.2.3 Performance of Alternatives

Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 examine the behavior of each of the proposed alternatives
for uniformity and randomness. Also of interest is the cost of implementation on the
Mica2, particularly as it relates to computation time. Analysis of the compiled binaries
reveals the number of instructions and cycles required to implement both RandomLFSR
and MaximalLFSR. It is shown that the number of branch instructions of RandomMLCG
increases significantly compared to both RandomLFSR and MaximalLFSR, which
hinders an exact static analysis of the cycle requirements. Simulation software could
have been used to obtain a more precise profile of RandomMLCG than is presented in
this section. However, the main objective of this analysis is to show that one alternative
is superior to the other, which is clearly evident with the analysis presented.
Furthermore, the analysis of RandomLFSR and MaximalLFSR is as precise as possible
and simulation of these modules would not have added any new information.
Table 10 shows the results of the analysis. The instruction count, cycles required
for execution, total number of branch instructions in the assembly, and memory
requirements in bytes are listed for each PRNG. The third column lists the number of
cycles required for execution of a single function call. Branch statements result in
different cycle requirements depending on the internal state of the PRNG and are
represented by multiple values. RandomMLCG has branch statements within branch
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statements. There are two main branches of execution, which are presented with
approximate values since nested branch statements result in different cycle counts.
Table 10. A Static Analysis of Alternative PRNGs Versus RandomLFSR
PRNG

RandomLFSR
MaximalLFSR
RandomMLCG
Optimized
MaximalLFSR

Instruction
Count
21
41
540

74

20, 23
146, 148
~916, ~1024

Branch
Instructions
1
5
34

Size
(bytes)
46
86
1108

71, 73

1

152

Cycles

Four of the five branch statements in MaximalLFSR are used in an iterative loop
that evaluates a register that is decremented each pass through the loop. Optimization of
the assembly code could eliminate the execution of 75 cycles resulting in a requirement
of 71 or 73 cycles. Of course, this is at a cost of 66 bytes of program memory. See
Appendix E for a discussion of the optimization used to determine these figures.
4.3 Summary

This chapter consists of two main sections. Section 4.1 discusses the EBS and the
work carried out to answer the questions put forth in Section 3.1.1. Section 4.1.1 presents
the analysis performed on RandomLFSR to determine its behavior. Section 4.1.2 shows
how the short period of RandomLFSR leaves EccM 2.0’s key generation algorithm
vulnerable to a brute-force attack. Finally, Section 4.1.3 presents the steps taken to
exploit this vulnerability and determines the expected time to identify a private key given
a mote’s address and public key.
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Section 4.2 discusses the PPS and the analysis necessary to meet the goals laid out
in Section 3.1.1, namely the goal of finding an alternative capable of thwarting a bruteforce attack on EccM 2.0. Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 presents PRNGs based on LFSR and
LCG designs, respectively. Both alternatives succeed at thwarting the brute-force attack
defined in this work. Section 4.2.3 presents the cost of implementation on the Mica2 for
each alternative as well as the costs associated with RandomLFSR.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Restatement of the Problem and Conclusions

Chapter 3 asks the following questions:
1. Can the weaknesses of the LFSR-PRNG in TinyOS be exploited to break the
public key cryptography and, if so, how fast can it be done?
2. Will the rate of key compromise exceed the mote’s capacity to rekey?
Chapter 4 shows that the LFSR-PRNG used in TinyOS exposes the elliptic curve
cryptosystem proposed in [Mal04,MWS04] to a brute-force attack. The average time to
discover the private key for a given mote is 97.14 milliseconds. Practically speaking, this
requires the mote to rekey once every 15 minutes. This equates to a 7.6% duty cycle.
While the needs of DSN applications vary widely, this is an additional constraint on an
already severely constrained environment. There is a better solution.
Another stated goal of this work is to produce an alternative to the RandomLFSR
module in TinyOS that thwarts the brute-force attack defined in this thesis. One
alternative, MaximalLFSR, was proposed by the author. Another alternative,
RandomMLCG, comes packaged with the beta release of TinyOS 2.0. Although both fail
requirements of a cryptographically secure PRNG due to their linear nature, they succeed
at defeating the brute-force attack when the seed is kept secret. MaximalLFSR does this
at a much lower cost than RandomMLCG while requiring significantly more computation
time on the part of the attacker (6.6 years versus 3.3 years).
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5.2 Contributions and Significance

The main contribution of this thesis is the analysis of the current RandomLFSR
module distributed with the current version of TinyOS and in the beta release of TinyOS
2.0. This module is used throughout the operating system and in a wide array of
applications. While it is likely that many applications using RandomLFSR are tuned to
operate with its quirkiness, certain seeds are shown to produce sequences of only a few
numbers. At the very least, users of TinyOS should be made aware of these limited seeds
and avoid them. Even better, RandomLFSR should be replaced with MaximalLFSR, as it
performs comparably in terms of execution time and memory requirements.
A secondary contribution includes the demonstration of a brute-force attack on
EccM 2.0, an implementation of ECDLP on the Mica2. Although it is a simplistic attack
that is easily thwarted, it examines the threat of such an attack given a computationally
superior attacker that future DSNs could face in the field. A determined attacker could
transmit public keys overheard via a laptop connected to a mote to a more powerful
computing system. The attack described in this thesis can be easily modified to work in
parallel and use the power of distributed computing to break the cryptosystem more
quickly.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research

In the process of answering the questions put forth in this thesis, many more
questions surfaced. Perhaps most tantalizing is the possibility that the public keys could
somehow be correlated to the underlying sequence used to generate the private keys. The
structures of RandomLFSR and MaximalLFSR are very simplistic and quite a bit of
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mathematical theory could be applied to discover nonrandom properties. If these
properties reveal themselves in the key space of the mote, perhaps they could be
generalized to apply to all motes. Thus, the public key could be used to determine which
sequence is used and where in the sequence the key is generated from. This information
could then be used to generate the private key.
EccM 2.0 itself still requires much work before it is complete. A generalized
protocol for exchanging keys in an arbitrarily large network must be devised. In addition,
the shared key is actually a point on the elliptic curve used in EccM 2.0. To use this
shared secret in a symmetric key cipher, a secure mechanism is needed for transforming
this shared secret into a secret key suitable for use in TinySec or other symmetric
cryptosystem. One such mechanism is a cryptographic hash function. These can also be
used in combination with a counter to provide secure key generation. An efficient
implementation of a cryptographic hash function in nesC can serve dually as a source of
random bits for cryptographic keys and a secure hash of the shared key produced by
EccM 2.0.
The brute-force attack described in this thesis works well on relatively small key
spaces. However, a key space of only 225 requires roughly 18 days of computation,
assuming 97.14 milliseconds per private-public key operation, to discover one key.
Obviously, it does not scale well because it is limited to one laptop with a single
processor. A determined attacker with greater computational power can easily overcome
the key space provided by MaximalLFSR. Indeed, using a system similar to the one used
to crack DES, the entire key space of a WSN using MaximalLFSR could be computed in
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less than a second. This information could then be used to simply lookup the private key
of the public key in use. This begs the question of how large the key space must be to
thwart such an attacker. WSNs are extremely susceptible to brute-force attacks that look
to overpower the resources of the individual mote.
5.4 Summary

This work presents a brute-force attack on an implementation of ECDLP on
TinyOS. The attack exploits the short period of the RandomLFSR module of TinyOS. It
demonstrates an average compromise time of 25 minutes for the longest sequence
produced by RandomLFSR. Over 50% of possible mote addresses lead to significantly
shorter compromise times. The possibility of distributing the attack over multiple
machines is an area for future research that could lead to even shorter compromise times.
Two alternatives to RandomLFSR are examined that can thwart the brute-force
attack presented in this work. RandomMLCG, the multiple linear congruential generator
distributed with TinyOS 2.0 beta, offers a much longer period of 231-1, but at a
significantly greater cost in terms of computation time and program memory.
MaximalLFSR, an alternative based on the well-known mathematics of LFSRs, performs
more closely to RandomLFSR and roughly doubles the length of the period provided by
RandomMLCG.
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Appendix A: Derivation of Equation Two

Equation 2 in Section 3.3, page 36, is given as:
2r
×1.9 = D
n
In part, this is derived from the fact that one rekey per hour on the Mica2 results in a duty
cycle of 1.9%. Thus, the constant 1.9 in equation 2. It remains to determine a formula
for calculating the expected number of keys compromised per hour. Equation 1 gives the
expected time for one key compromise as:
1
tn
2
where t, is the time for one private-public key operation and n is the size of the key space.
Thus, if t is in hours, the expected number of key compromises per hour is simply the
multiplicative inverse of equation 1:

2
tn

(3)

Equation 3 must be in hours. To avoid confusion a new variable, r, is defined as the

number of key trials per hour and is given as:
r=

1
t

where t is in hours. Substituting r in for t in equation 3 gives:
2
2r
=
1
n n
r
which is the first term in equation 2.
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Appendix B: Computing the Average Private-Public Key Operation

The computation of the key spaces for the first 27 sequential mote IDs provided
ample opportunity to measure the time required to compute a single private-public key
pair. In fact, exactly 566,500 private-public key pairs are computed. Computing the key
pair involves two function calls, generatePrivateKey( int index, byte[] arrSequence ) and
generatePublicKey( byte[] privKey ). See Appendix X, pages XX and XX, respectively.
The system clock is polled before the first call and after the second call and the difference
is taken as the time to compute the key pair. This result is stored along with the public
key in a text file for retrieval at a later time. It proved easier to write a program to
compute the average then to load 566,500 measurements in to Excel. The program
produced the output displayed in Figure 12.
Interestingly, if the formula for computing the variance is done by the program, it
throws an exception because a non-terminating decimal expansion occurs when the JVM

Average
Sum
Sum of Squares
Count

97.14295675198588
5.5031485E7
5.372645861E9
566500

Measurement
78
79
93
94
109
110
125
140
141

Frequency
5591
715
107196
323739
81218
47989
42
4
6

Figure 12. Output of Program for Calculating Statistics of Time to Compute PrivatePublic Key Operations
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tries to represent one of the terms of the equation as a double. Consequently, this data
was then used to perform the following computations by calculator:
n∑ i =1 xi2 −
n

s2 =

(∑ x )
n

2

i =1 i

n(n − 1)
566500*5372645861 − 55031485
=
566500*566499
= 47.152

s = 47.152
= 6.86842
s
n
6.87
= ±1.645
566500
= ±0.015

CI = ± z1−α 2
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Appendix C: Data Tables

Table 11. Statistics for Average File Load Times
Mote ID
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Average
1665.6
2362.5
2343.7
1554.7
2339.1
2339
2339.2
1559.3
2340.7
25
1554.7
546.8
1556.3
1560.9
1553.1
21.9
1553.1
1559.4
1554.7
1557.8
2340.6
1559.4
1554.7
548.4
1553.1
26.6
2339.1

Sum
16656
23625
23437
15547
23391
23390
23392
15593
23407
250
15547
5468
15563
15609
15531
219
15531
15594
15547
15578
23406
15594
15547
5484
15531
266
23391

75

Variance
2260.71
3398.5
430.68
600.01
709.88
555.78
547.29
693.34
696.01
60
600.01
160.4
725.57
824.99
646.32
68.54
489.21
757.6
784.23
596.4
759.16
590.49
767.12
133.16
339.66
57.16
386.1

Standard
Dev
47.547
58.297
20.753
24.495
26.644
23.575
23.394
26.331
26.382
7.746
24.495
12.665
26.936
28.723
25.423
8.279
22.118
27.525
28.004
24.421
27.553
24.300
27.697
11.539
18.430
7.560
19.649

90% CI
20.7943
25.4956
9.0761
10.7128
11.6524
10.3103
10.2313
11.5159
11.5380
3.3876
10.7128
5.5389
11.7804
12.5616
11.1185
3.6208
9.6732
12.0377
12.2474
10.6805
12.0500
10.6274
12.1131
5.0466
8.0601
3.3064
8.5935

Table 12. Statistics for Network Size = 3
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
Confidence Level
(90%)

4479343.05
331548.9481
4516843.5
1482731.972
2.19849E+12
2098188
7655797
89586861
20
573292.1584

Table 13. Statistics for Network Size = 6
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
Confidence Level
(90%)

8291583.7
425433.7989
7802117
1902597.789
3.61988E+12
5978250
13374094
165831674
20
735631.5327

Table 14. Statistics for Network Size = 9
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
Confidence Level
(90%)
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13336702.35
664054.1218
12922953
2969740.314
8.81936E+12
8710234
19740094
266734047
20
1148237.758

Table 15. Statistics for Network Size = 27
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
Confidence Level
(90%)

27303081.15
1054178.669
27383156.5
4714430.33
2.22259E+13
19027094
35832671
546061623
20
1822814.906

Table 16. Expected Performance for Sequential Network Sizes
Cumulative ½ tn, t=97.14
Mote ID
Key Space
(msecs)
0
21159
1027692.63
1
52955
2572024.35
2
84751
4116356.07
3
105910
5144048.7
4
137706
6688380.42
5
169502
8232712.14
6
201298
9777043.86
7
222457 10804736.49
8
254253 12349068.21
9
254578 12364853.46
10
275737 13392546.09
11
283208 13755412.56
12
304367 14783105.19
13
325526 15810797.82
14
346685 16838490.45
15
346979 16852770.03
16
368138 17880462.66
17
389297 18908155.29
18
410456 19935847.92
19
431615 20963540.55
20
463411 22507872.27
21
484570
23535564.9
22
505729 24563257.53
23
513200
24926124
24
534359 25953816.63
25
534704 25970573.28
26
566500
27514905
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Appendix E: Optimization of Assembly

Figure 12 presents the assembly code of MaximalLFSR. As Table 9 states, it
consists of 5 branch instructions, located at addresses 0x1A4, 0x1AE, 0x1BC, 0x1DE,
and 0x1DC. Addresses 0x1DE and 0x1DC are relative jumps and are required for proper
execution. The brne instructions on the other hand are part of a loop that operates
similarly to a do-while. For instance, the instructions in the address space 0x19C-0x1A4
constitute the first loop. The ldi instruction represents the initial condition and loads the
constant 16 into the register r26. The next two instructions constitute the loop’s work.
The dec instruction decrements r26 by one. The brne instruction evaluates r26 to see if it
equals zero. If not, the program jumps to the start of the loop at 0x19E at a cost of 2 CPU
cycles. This occurs 15 more times until the final dec instruction sets r26 to zero and the
brne instruction evaluates to false at a cost of one cycle. This loop ultimately requires 80
cycles, 1 for the initial condition, 5 for each execution of the loop when brne evaluates to
true (5*15=75), and 4 for the final loop iteration.
Alternatively, the loops could be manually unrolled and the work portion of the
loop could be repeated 16 times. This increases the number of instructions the program
contains resulting in a larger memory requirement for the program. However, the
unrolling of the loop decreases the number of instructions that it executes, particularly the
costly branch instruction. This essentially halves the execution time of MaximalLFSR.
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194:
196:
198:
19a:
19c:
19e:
1a0:
1a2:
1a4:
1a6:
1a8:
1aa:
1ac:
1ae:
1b0:
1b2:
1b4:
1b6:
1b8:
1ba:
1bc:
1be:
1c0:
1c2:
1c4:
1c6:
1c8:
1ca:
1cc:
1ce:
1d0:
1d2:
1d4:
1d6:
1d8:
1da:
1dc:
1de:
1e0:
1e4:
1e8:

2f b7
f8 94
62 2f
ac 01
a0 e1
36 95
27 95
aa 95
e1 f7
f5 e0
96 95
87 95
fa 95
e1 f7
28 27
ca 01
e3 e0
96 95
87 95
ea 95
e1 f7
28 27
ca 01
96 95
87 95
96 95
87 95
28 27
24 27
ca 01
96 95
87 95
20 ff
03 c0
ac 01
50 68
01 c0
ac 01
50 93 17 01
40 93 16 01
6f bf

in
cli
mov
movw
ldi
lsr
ror
dec
brne
ldi
lsr
ror
dec
brne
eor
movw
ldi
lsr
ror
dec
brne
eor
movw
lsr
ror
lsr
ror
eor
eor
movw
lsr
ror
sbrs
rjmp
movw
ori
rjmp
movw
sts
sts
out

r18, 0x3f
r22, r18
r20, r24
r26, 0x10
r19
r18
r26
.-8
r31, 0x05
r25
r24
r31
.-8
r18, r24
r24, r20
r30, 0x03
r25
r24
r30
.-8
r18, r24
r24, r20
r25
r24
r25
r24
r18, r24
r18, r20
r24, r20
r25
r24
r18, 0
.+6
r20, r24
r21, 0x80
.+2
r20, r24
0x0117, r21
0x0116, r20
0x3f, r22

; 63

; 16

; 0x19e
;5

; 0x1a8

;3

; 0x1b6

; 0x1de
; 128
; 0x1e0

; 63

Figure 16. Assembly Code for MaxmalLFSR
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Appendix F: EBS Java Code
import java.io.*;
import java.util.Hashtable;
import java.util.Random;
public class EBS
{
Random rndSim;
Hashtable tblSourceToPubKey;
Hashtable tblSourceToPrivKey;
KeyStore[] arrKeyDict;
SimLogger current;
public static void main( String[] args )
{
EBS sim = new EBS();
if ( args[0].equals( "-sim" ) )
{
long seed = Long.parseLong( args[1] );
sim.runSim( seed );
}
}
public EBS()
{
tblSourceToPubKey = new Hashtable();
tblSourceToPrivKey = new Hashtable();
}
public void runSim( long seed )
{
rndSim = new Random( seed );
// create the "motes" and load keys for each mote
current = new SimLogger( 3, "Deterministic", 0 );
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simulateDeterministic( 3 );
System.out.println( "Completed 3-deterministic experiment..." );
current = new SimLogger( 6, "Deterministic", 0 );
simulateDeterministic( 6 );
System.out.println( "Completed 6-deterministic experiment..." );
current = new SimLogger( 9, "Deterministic", 0 );
simulateDeterministic( 9 );
System.out.println( "Completed 9-deterministic experiment..." );
current = new SimLogger( 27, "Deterministic", 0 );
simulateDeterministic( 27 );
System.out.println( "Completed 27-deterministic experiment..." );
for ( int i=1; i < 11; i++ )
{
current = new SimLogger( 3, "Deterministic", i );
simulateRandom( 3 );
System.out.println( "Completed 3-random-" + i + " experiment..." );
}
for ( int i=1; i < 11; i++ )
{
current = new SimLogger( 6, "Deterministic", i );
simulateRandom( 6 );
System.out.println( "Completed 6-random-" + i + " experiment..." );
}
for ( int i=1; i < 11; i++ )
{
current = new SimLogger( 9, "Deterministic", i );
simulateRandom( 9 );
System.out.println( "Completed 9-random-" + i + " experiment..." );
}
for ( int i=1; i < 11; i++ )
{
current = new SimLogger( 27, "Deterministic", i );
simulateRandom( 27 );
System.out.println( "Completed 27-random-" + i + " experiment..." );
}
}
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public void simulateDeterministic( int size )
{
current.simStart = System.currentTimeMillis();
KeyStore ks = null;
for ( int i=0; i < size; i++ )
{
String fname = i + ".ks";
try
{
ks = new KeyStore( fname );
}
catch ( IOException ioex )
{
System.out.println( "Failed to load keystore." );
return;
}
EBSPoint pubKey = ks.getKey( 0 );
current.logKeySelectionf( i, ks.getLastIndex() );
messageReceived( 65535, new KeyMessage( i, (short) 1, pubKey.getShortX() ) );
messageReceived( 65535, new KeyMessage( i, (short) 0, pubKey.getShortY() ) );
}
current.simEnd = System.currentTimeMillis();
current.writeResults();
}
public void simulateRandom( int size )
{
current.simStart = System.currentTimeMillis();
KeyStore ks = null;
for ( int i=0; i < size; i++ )
{
String fname = i + ".ks";
try
{
ks = new KeyStore( fname );
}
catch ( IOException ioex )
{

82

System.out.println( "Failed to load keystore." );
return;
}
EBSPoint pubKey = ks.getRandomKey( rndSim );
current.logKeySelectionf( i, ks.getLastIndex() );
messageReceived( 65535, new KeyMessage( i, (short) 1, pubKey.getShortX() ) );
messageReceived( 65535, new KeyMessage( i, (short) 0, pubKey.getShortY() ) );
}
current.simEnd = System.currentTimeMillis();
current.writeResults();
}
public void messageReceived(int dstaddr, Message msg)
{
if ( msg instanceof KeyMessage )
{
KeyMessage kmsg = (KeyMessage) msg;
int sourceID = kmsg.get_sourceID();
short isX = kmsg.get_isX();
short[] coord = kmsg.get_coord();
EBSPoint pubKey = null;
Object tmp = tblSourceToPubKey.get( new Integer( sourceID ) );
if ( tmp == null )
{
pubKey = new EBSPoint();
tblSourceToPubKey.put( new Integer( sourceID ), pubKey );
}
else
{
pubKey = (EBSPoint) tmp;
}
if ( isX != 0 )
{
for ( int i=0; i < coord.length; i++ )
{
pubKey.x[i] = (byte) coord[i];
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}
}
else
{
for ( int i=0; i < coord.length; i++ )
{
pubKey.y[i] = (byte) coord[i];
}
//fire off encryption breaking thread
findPrivateKey( sourceID );
}
}
}
private void findPrivateKey( int sourceID )
{
long start = System.currentTimeMillis();
boolean found = false;
EBSPoint ActualKey = (EBSPoint) tblSourceToPubKey.get( new Integer( sourceID ) );
EBSPoint G = EccM.initializePoint();
int[] arrRndSequence = EccM.generateRandomSequence( sourceID );
int index = 0;
for ( ; index < arrRndSequence.length; index++ )
{
byte[] privKey = EccM.generatePrivateKey( index, arrRndSequence );
EBSPoint trialKey = EccM.generatePublicKey( privKey );
if ( ActualKey.isEqual( trialKey ) )
{
found = true;
tblSourceToPrivKey.put( new Integer( sourceID ), privKey );
break;
}
}
long time = System.currentTimeMillis() - start;
if ( !found )
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current.logResults( sourceID, ((long) -1), -1 );
else
current.logResults( sourceID, time, index+1 );
}
}
/**
* Implementation of ECC module.
*
* Heavily borrowed from Malan's EccM module in TinyOS
*/
import java.math.BigInteger;
public class EccM
{
public static final String strOrder = "4000000000000000000020108a2e0cc0d99f8a5ef";
public static final String strX = "2fe13c0537bbc11acaa07d793de4e6d5e5c94eee8";
public static final String strY = "289070fb05d38ff58321f2e800536d538ccdaa3d9";
public static final char[] digits = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c',
'd', 'e', 'f' };
public static final int NUMBITS = 163;
public static final int NUMWORDS = (int) (2 * ((NUMBITS +1)/8.0 + 0.5));
public static EBSCurve E = new EBSCurve();
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// bint
// routines
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
/**
* Clears bint.
*/
public static void b_clear(byte[] a)
{
a = new byte[NUMWORDS];
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}
/**
* Prints bint in hexadecimal to debugging console.
*/
public static void b_print(byte[] a)
{
char[] output = new char[a.length*3];
// iterate over bint's bytes, displaying each in hexadecimal
for ( int i = 0; i < a.length; i++)
{
int b = a[i] & 0xff;
output[i*3+1] = digits[b & 15];
b = b >>> 4;
output[i*3] = digits[b & 15];
output[i*3+2] = ' ';
}
System.out.println( new String( output ) );
}

/**
* Prints lower half of bint in hexadecimal to debugging console.
*/
public static void b_halfprint(byte[] a)
{
char[] output = new char[a.length/2*3];
// iterate over bint's bytes, displaying each in hexadecimal
for ( int i = 0; i < a.length/2; i++)
{
int b = a[i+a.length/2] & 0xff;
output[i*3+1] = digits[b & 15];
b = b >>> 4;
output[i*3] = digits[b & 15];
output[i*3+2] = ' ';
}
System.out.println( new String( output ) );
}
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/**
* Sets ith bit (where most significant bit is 0th bit) of bint.
*/
public static void b_setbit(byte[] a, int i)
{
if ( a.length*8 < i )
return; // not enough bits
a[a.length - 1 - i/8] |= (1 << (i%8));
}

/**
* Clears ith bit (where most significant bit is 0th bit) of bint.
*/
public static void b_clearbit(byte[] a, int i)
{
if ( i == 0 )
return;
if ( a.length*8 < i )
return; // not enough bits
a[a.length - 1 - i/8] &= (0xff ^ (1 << (i % 8)));
}
/**
* Returns TRUE iff bint is zero.
*/
public static boolean b_iszero(byte[] a)
{
for (int i = 0; i < a.length; i++ )
if ( a[i] != 0 )
return false;
return true;
}
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/**
* b = a.
* Assumes a.length == b.length
*/
public static void b_copy(byte[] a, byte[] b)
{
System.arraycopy( a, 0, b, 0, a.length );
}

/**
* c = a XOR b.
*/
public static void b_xor(byte[] a, byte[] b, byte[] c)
{
// let c[] = a[] XOR b[]; casting effectively unrolls loop a bit,
// saving us some cycles
for ( int i = 0; i < NUMWORDS; i++)
c[i] = (byte) (a[i] ^ b[i]);
}

/**
* Returns -1 if a < b, 0 if a == b, and 1 if a > b.
*/
public static int b_compareto(byte[] a, byte[] b)
{
for ( int i = 0; i < NUMWORDS; i++ )
{
if ( a[i] != b[i] )
{
int x = a[i] & 0xff;
int y = b[i] & 0xff;
return x < y ? -1 : 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
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/**
* Shifts bint left by n bits, storing result in b.
*
* a and b are allowed to point to the same memory.
*/
public static void b_shiftleft(byte[] a, int n, byte[] b)
{
if ( n == 0 )
{
System.arraycopy( a, 0, b, 0, NUMWORDS );
return;
}
// storage for shift's magnitudes
int nBytes = n >>> 3;
int nBits = n & 0x7;
if ( nBytes != 0 )
{
for ( int i = nBytes; i < NUMWORDS; i++ )
b[i-nBytes] = a[i];
for ( int i = NUMWORDS - nBytes; i < NUMWORDS; i++ )
b[i] = 0;
}
else if ( nBytes == 0 )
System.arraycopy( a, 0, b, 0, NUMWORDS );
int nBits2 = 8 - nBits;
for ( int i = 1; i < NUMWORDS; i++ )
{
b[i-1] = (byte) (((b[i-1] << nBits) & 0xff) | ((b[i] & 0xff)>>> nBits2));
}
b[NUMWORDS-1] <<= nBits;
}

/**
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* Returns the number of bits in the shortest possible
* representation of this bint.
*/
public static int b_bitlength( byte[] a )
{
// local storage
int n, x, y;
// iterate over other bytes, looking for most significant set bit;
// algorithm from Henry S. Warren Jr., Hacker's Delight
for ( int i = 0; i < a.length; i++)
{
x = a[i] & 0xff;
if ( x != 0)
{
n = 8;
y = x >>> 4;
if (y != 0)
{
n = n - 4; x = y;
}
y = x >>> 2;
if (y != 0)
{
n = n - 2;
x = y;
}
y = x >>> 1;
if (y != 0)
return (a.length - i - 1) * 8 + (8 - (n - 2));
return (a.length - i - 1) * 8 + (8 - (n - x));
}
}
// if no bits are set, bint is 0
return 0;
}
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/**
* Returns TRUE iff ith bit of bint (where index of least
* significant bit is 0) is set. Recall that bints
* are big-endian.
*/
public static boolean b_testbit(byte[] a, int i)
{
return ( a[NUMWORDS - 1 - (i/8)] & ( 1 << (i % 8) ) ) != 0;
}

/**
* Returns TRUE iff bints are equal.
*/
public static boolean b_isequal(byte[] a, byte[] b)
{
// iterate over bints, looking for a difference
for ( int i = 0; i < NUMWORDS; i++ )
if (a[i] != b[i])
return false;
// if no difference found, bints are equal
return true;
}
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// point
// routines
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
/**
* Clears point.
*/
public static void p_clear( EBSPoint P0 )
{
// clear each coordinate
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b_clear( P0.x );
b_clear( P0.y );
}
/**
* Returns TRUE iff P0 == (0,0).
*/
public static boolean p_iszero( EBSPoint P0 )
{
return b_iszero(P0.x) && b_iszero( P0.y );
}
/**
* P1 = P0.
*/
public static void p_copy(EBSPoint P0, EBSPoint P1)
{
// copy point's ordinates
b_copy( P0.x, P1.x );
b_copy( P0.y, P1.y );
}
/**
* Prints point.
*/
public static void p_print( EBSPoint P0 )
{
System.out.println( "x:" );
b_halfprint( P0.x );
System.out.println( "y:" );
b_halfprint( P0.y );
}

////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// curve
// routines
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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/**
* Multiplies P0 by n, storing result in P1. P1 cannot be P0.
*
* Based on Algorithm IV.1 on p. 63 of "Elliptic Curves in Cryptography"
* by I. F. Blake, G. Seroussi, N. P. Smart.
*/
public static void c_mul( byte[] n, EBSPoint P0, EBSPoint P1 )
{
// index variable
int i;
// clear point
p_clear( P1 );
// perform multiplication
for (i = b_bitlength(n) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
c_add( P1, P1, P1 );
if ( b_testbit( n, i ) )
c_add( P1, P0, P1 );
}
}
/**
* Q = P1 + P2. Algorithm 7 in An Overview of Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
* Lopez and Dahab.
*
* P1, P2, and Q are allowed to reference the same memory.
*/
public static void c_add( EBSPoint P1, EBSPoint P2, EBSPoint Q )
{
byte[] lambda = new byte[NUMWORDS];
byte[] numerator = new byte[NUMWORDS];
EBSPoint T = new EBSPoint();
// 1. if P1 = 0
if ( p_iszero( P1 ) )
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{
// Q <-- P2
p_copy( P2, Q );
return;
}
// 2. if P2 = 0
if ( p_iszero( P2 ) )
{
// Q <-- P1
p_copy( P1, Q );
return;
}
// 3. if x1 = x2
if ( b_isequal( P1.x, P2.x ) )
{
// if y1 = y2
if ( b_isequal( P1.y, P2.y ) )
{
// lambda = x1 + y1/x1
f_inv( P1.x, lambda );
f_mul( lambda, P1.y, lambda );
f_add( lambda, P1.x, lambda );
// x3 = lambda^2 + lambda + a
f_mul( lambda, lambda, T.x );
f_add( T.x, lambda, T.x );
f_add( T.x, E.a4, T.x );
}
else
{
// Q <-- 0
b_clear( T.x );
b_clear( T.y );
}
}
else
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{
// lambda <-- (y2 + y1)/(x2 + x1)
f_add( P2.y, P1.y, numerator );
f_add( P2.x, P1.x, lambda );
f_inv( lambda, lambda );
f_mul( numerator, lambda, lambda );
// x3 <-- lambda^2 + lambda + x1 + x2 + a
f_mul( lambda, lambda, T.x );
f_add( T.x, lambda, T.x );
f_add( T.x, P1.x, T.x );
f_add( T.x, P2.x, T.x );
f_add( T.x, E.a4, T.x );
}
// y3 <-- lambda(x1 + x2) + x3 + y1
f_add( P1.x, T.x, T.y );
f_mul( T.y, lambda, T.y );
f_add( T.y, T.x, T.y );
f_add( T.y, P1.y, T.y );
// return
p_copy( T, Q );
}

////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// field
// routines
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
/**
* c = a + b.
*
* a, b, and/or c are allowed to point to the same memory.
*/
public static void f_add( byte[] a, byte[] b, byte[] c )
{
b_xor( a, b, c );
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}
/**
* c = ab mod f
*
* Algorithm 4 from High-Speed Software Multiplication in F_{2^m}.
*
* a, b, and/or c are allowed to point to the same memory.
*/
public static void f_mul( byte[] a, byte[] b, byte[] c )
{
// local variables
byte[] T = new byte[NUMWORDS];
// perform multiplication
for ( int j = 7; j > -1; j-- )
{
for ( int i = 0; i <= NUMWORDS/2-1; i++ )
if ( b_testbit( a, i*8+j ) )
for ( int k = 0; k <= NUMWORDS/2-1; k++ )
T[NUMWORDS - 1 - (k+i)] ^= b[NUMWORDS - 1 - k];
if ( j != 0 )
b_shiftleft(T, 1, T);
}
// modular reduction
f_mod( T, c );
}
/**
* b = a (mod modulus).
*
* a and b are allowed to point to the same memory.
* Hardcoded at present with default curve's parameters to save cycles.
*/
public static void f_mod( byte[] a, byte[] b )
{
// local variables
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int blr, shf;
int comp;
byte[] r = new byte[NUMWORDS];
// modular reduction
comp = b_compareto( a, E.modulus
if ( comp < 0 )
{
b_copy( a, b );
return;
}
else if ( comp == 0 )
{
b_copy( r, b );
return;
}
b_copy( a, r );
blr = b_bitlength( r );
while ( blr >= E.bitlength )
{
shf = blr - E.bitlength;
r[NUMWORDS - ((163+shf) / 8) r[NUMWORDS - ( (7+shf) / 8) r[NUMWORDS - ( (6+shf) / 8) r[NUMWORDS - ( (3+shf) / 8) r[NUMWORDS - ( (0+shf) / 8) blr = b_bitlength( r );
}
b_copy(r, b);
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}
/**
* d = a^-1.
*
* Algorithm 8 in "Software Implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography
* Over Binary Fields", D. Hankerson, J.L. Hernandez, A. Menezes.
*
* a and d are allowed to point to the same memory.
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*/
public static void f_inv(byte[] a, byte[] d)
{
// local variables
int i;
int j;
byte[] ptr;
byte[][] anonymous = new byte[5][NUMWORDS];
anonymous[0]
= new byte[NUMWORDS];
byte[] b
= new byte[NUMWORDS];
byte[] c
= new byte[NUMWORDS];
byte[] u
= new byte[NUMWORDS];
byte[] v
= new byte[NUMWORDS];
anonymous[1] = b;
anonymous[2] = c;
anonymous[3] = u;
anonymous[4] = v;
// 1. b <-- 1, c <-- 1, u <-- a, v <-- f
for (i = 0; i < NUMWORDS; i++)
{
b[i] = 0;
c[i] = 0;
v[i] = E.modulus[i];
}
b[NUMWORDS-1] = 0x01;
f_mod(a, u);
// 2. While deg(u) != 0
int bitlen = b_bitlength(u);
while ( bitlen > 1 )
{
// 2.1 j <-- deg(u) - deg(v).
j = ( b_bitlength(u) - 1 ) - ( b_bitlength(v) - 1 );
// 2.2 If j < 0 then:
if ( j < 0 )
{
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// u <--> v
ptr = new byte[NUMWORDS];
System.arraycopy( u, 0, ptr, 0, NUMWORDS );
System.arraycopy( v, 0, u, 0, NUMWORDS );
System.arraycopy( ptr, 0, v, 0, NUMWORDS );
// b <--> c
ptr = new byte[NUMWORDS];
System.arraycopy( b, 0, ptr, 0, NUMWORDS );
System.arraycopy( c, 0, b, 0, NUMWORDS );
System.arraycopy( ptr, 0, c, 0, NUMWORDS );
// j <-- -j
j = -j;
}
// 2.3 u <-- u + x^jv
switch (j)
{
case 0:
f_add(u, v, u);
f_add(b, c, b);
break;
case 1:
b_shiftleft( v, 1, anonymous[0]);
f_add(u, anonymous[0], u);
b_shiftleft(c, 1, anonymous[0]);
f_add(b, anonymous[0], b);
break;
case 2:
b_shiftleft(v, 2, anonymous[0]);
f_add(u, anonymous[0], u);
b_shiftleft(c, 2, anonymous[0]);
f_add(b, anonymous[0], b);
break;
default:
b_shiftleft(v, j, anonymous[0]);
f_add(u, anonymous[0], u);
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b_shiftleft(c, j, anonymous[0]);
f_add(b, anonymous[0], b);
break;
}
bitlen = b_bitlength(u);
}
b_copy(b, d);
}
/**
* This function generates all possible public keys from the given sequence.
* rndSequence is a pseudo-random sequence (PRS) generated from RandomLFSR
* The function does not generate all possible permutations of rndSequence and assumes
* the sequence is generated sequentially (i.e. atomically)
*/
public static EBSPoint[] generateKeys( int[] rndSequence )
{
EBSPoint[] arrKeys = new EBSPoint[rndSequence.length];
EBSPoint G = initializePoint();
int len = rndSequence.length;
for ( int index = 0; index < len; index++ )
{
byte[] privKey = new byte[NUMWORDS];
for ( int i = NUMWORDS/2; i < NUMWORDS; i++ )
{
/**
* The calculation for the index of rndSequence is as
* index = the starting point of this random sequence
* (i-NUMWORDS/2) = essentially becomes the increment
* use modulo rndSequence.length to wrap around since
* (rndSeqnence.length-1)
*/
int eccNum = rndSequence[(index + ( i - NUMWORDS/2 ))
privKey[i] = (byte) eccNum;
}
/**
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follows
value for running through rnd sequence
index ranges from 0 thru

% len];

* This section of code essentially sidesteps EccM's b_mod.
* Initial tests indicate minimal performance degradation. If performance becomes an issue, may
need
* to revisit implementing b_mod.

Implementing b_mod in Java could prove difficult because of use

of
* pointers when passing parameters to subfunctions.
*/
BigInteger bint = new BigInteger( 1, privKey );
BigInteger r = new BigInteger( strOrder, 16 );
bint = bint.mod( r );
byte[] z = bint.toByteArray();
privKey = new byte[NUMWORDS];
for ( int i = 0; i < z.length; i++ )
{
privKey[NUMWORDS - 1 - i] = z[z.length - 1 - i];
}
arrKeys[index] = new EBSPoint();
c_mul( privKey, G, arrKeys[index] );
}
return arrKeys;
}
public static byte[] generatePrivateKey( int index, int[] rndSequence )
{
byte[] privKey = new byte[NUMWORDS];
for ( int i = NUMWORDS/2; i < NUMWORDS; i++ )
{
int eccNum = rndSequence[(index + ( i - NUMWORDS/2 )) % rndSequence.length];
privKey[i] = (byte) eccNum;
}
BigInteger bint = new BigInteger( 1, privKey );
BigInteger r = new BigInteger( strOrder, 16 );
bint = bint.mod( r );
byte[] z = bint.toByteArray();
privKey = new byte[NUMWORDS];
for ( int i=0; i < z.length; i++ )
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privKey[NUMWORDS - 1 - i] = z[z.length - 1 - i];
return privKey;
}
public static EBSPoint generatePublicKey( byte[] privKey )
{
EBSPoint G = initializePoint();
EBSPoint pubKey = new EBSPoint();
c_mul( privKey, G, pubKey );
return pubKey;
}
public static String printHex( BigInteger bi )
{
String s = bi.toString( 16 );
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer();
int index = 0;
if ( (s.length() % 2) == 1 )
{
index = 1;
sb.append( "0" );
sb.append( s.substring( 0, 1 ) );
sb.append( " " );
}
while ( index < s.length() )
{
sb.append( s.substring( index, index+2 ) );
sb.append( " " );
index += 2;
}
return sb.substring( 0, sb.length()-1 );
}
public static String printHex( byte[] a )
{
char[] output = new char[a.length*3];
// iterate over bint's bytes, displaying each in hexadecimal
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for ( int i = 0; i < a.length; i++)
{
int b = a[i] & 0xff;
output[i*3+1] = digits[b & 15];
b = b >>> 4;
output[i*3] = digits[b & 15];
output[i*3+2] = ' ';
}
return new String( output );
}

public static EBSPoint initializePoint()
{
EBSPoint G = new EBSPoint();
// initilize
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS
G.x[NUMWORDS

Gx
- 21] = (byte) 0x02;
- 20] = (byte) 0xfe;
- 19] = (byte) 0x13;
- 18] = (byte) 0xc0;
- 17] = (byte) 0x53;
- 16] = (byte) 0x7b;
- 15] = (byte) 0xbc;
- 14] = (byte) 0x11;
- 13] = (byte) 0xac;
- 12] = (byte) 0xaa;
- 11] = (byte) 0x07;
- 10] = (byte) 0xd7;
- 9] = (byte) 0x93;
- 8] = (byte) 0xde;
- 7] = (byte) 0x4e;
- 6] = (byte) 0x6d;
- 5] = (byte) 0x5e;
- 4] = (byte) 0x5c;
- 3] = (byte) 0x94;
- 2] = (byte) 0xee;
- 1] = (byte) 0xe8;
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// initialize Gy
G.y[NUMWORDS - 21] = (byte) 0x02;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 20] = (byte) 0x89;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 19] = (byte) 0x07;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 18] = (byte) 0x0f;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 17] = (byte) 0xb0;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 16] = (byte) 0x5d;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 15] = (byte) 0x38;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 14] = (byte) 0xff;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 13] = (byte) 0x58;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 12] = (byte) 0x32;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 11] = (byte) 0x1f;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 10] = (byte) 0x2e;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 9] = (byte) 0x80;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 8] = (byte) 0x05;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 7] = (byte) 0x36;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 6] = (byte) 0xd5;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 5] = (byte) 0x38;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 4] = (byte) 0xcc;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 3] = (byte) 0xda;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 2] = (byte) 0xa3;
G.y[NUMWORDS - 1] = (byte) 0xd9;
return G;
}
public static String getPercent( int num, int den, int dec )
{
double percent = (double) num;
percent = percent/den * 100.0;
String ret_val = String.valueOf( percent );
int point = ret_val.indexOf( '.' );
if ( point + dec > ret_val.length() )
return ret_val.concat( getZeros( point+dec - ret_val.length() ) );
return ret_val.substring( 0, point + dec );
}
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public static String getZeros( int len )
{
char[] c = new char[len];
for ( int i = 0; i < len; i++ )
c[i] = '0';
return new String( c );
}
public static int[] generateRandomSequence( int seed )
{
RandomLFSR lfsr = new RandomLFSR( seed );
int numUnique = 0;
boolean[] rnd_vals = new boolean[65536];
int[] temp = new int[65536];
temp[numUnique] = lfsr.rand();
while ( !rnd_vals[temp[numUnique]] )
{
rnd_vals[temp[numUnique]] = true; // indicate value has been generated
temp[++numUnique] = lfsr.rand(); // get next "random" value
}
int[] arrRndSequence = new int[numUnique];
System.arraycopy( temp, 0, arrRndSequence, 0, arrRndSequence.length );
return arrRndSequence;
}
}
import
import
import
import
import
import

java.io.PrintWriter;
java.io.BufferedWriter;
java.io.FileWriter;
java.io.BufferedReader;
java.io.FileReader;
java.io.IOException;

public class KeyStore
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{
int moteID;
int[] arrRndSequence;
EBSPoint[] arrPubKey;
long generationTime;
int sequenceLength;
int lastIndex;
public KeyStore( int mid )
{
moteID = mid;
arrRndSequence = null;
arrPubKey = null;
generateKeys();
sequenceLength = arrRndSequence.length;
lastIndex = -1;
}
public KeyStore( String filename ) throws IOException
{
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader( new FileReader( filename ) );
String[] elements = in.readLine().split( " " );
moteID = Integer.parseInt( elements[2] );
elements = in.readLine().split( " " );
generationTime = Long.parseLong( elements[2] );
elements = in.readLine().split( " " );
int len = Integer.parseInt( elements[3] );
arrRndSequence = new int[len];
arrPubKey = new EBSPoint[len];
int i=0;
while ( in.ready() )
{
elements = in.readLine().split( ";" );
arrRndSequence[i] = Integer.parseInt( elements[1] );
String[] arrX = elements[2].split( " " );
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String[] arrY = elements[3].split( " " );
arrPubKey[i] = new EBSPoint();
for ( int j=0; j < EccM.NUMWORDS; j++ )
{
arrPubKey[i].x[j] = (byte) Integer.valueOf( arrX[j], 16 ).intValue();
arrPubKey[i].y[j] = (byte) Integer.valueOf( arrY[j], 16 ).intValue();
}
i++;
}
sequenceLength = arrRndSequence.length;
}
private void generateKeys()
{
long time = System.currentTimeMillis();
// create the random sequence
arrRndSequence = EccM.generateRandomSequence( moteID );
arrPubKey = EccM.generateKeys( arrRndSequence );
generationTime = System.currentTimeMillis() - time;
}
public EBSPoint getKey( int index )
{
lastIndex = index;
return arrPubKey[index];
}
public EBSPoint getRandomKey( Random prng )
{
lastIndex = prng.nextInt( sequenceLength );
return arrPubKey[index];
}
public int getLastIndex()
{
return lastIndex;
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}
public void writeKeys( String filename ) throws IOException
{
PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter(filename)));
out.println( "Mote ID: " + moteID );
out.println( "Generation Time: " + generationTime + " msecs" );
out.println( "Length of Sequence: " + sequenceLength );
for ( int i=0; i < sequenceLength; i++ )
{
out.println( i + ";" + arrRndSequence[i] + ";" + EccM.printHex( arrPubKey[i].x ) + ";" +
EccM.printHex( arrPubKey[i].y ) );
}
out.close();
}
}
public class RandomLFSR
{
private int TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS;
private int shiftReg;
private int initSeed;
private int mask;
public RandomLFSR( int seed )
{
TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS = seed;
/* Initialize the seed from the ID of the node */
//System.out.println( "RANDOM_LFSR initialized." );
shiftReg = 119 * 119 * (TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS + 1);
shiftReg = shiftReg & 0xffff;
initSeed = shiftReg;
mask = 137 * 29 * (TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS + 1);
mask = mask & 0xffff;
//for ( int i=0; i<65536; i++ )
//{
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// System.out.println( rand() );
//}
}
public int rand()
{
/* Return the next 16 bit random number */
boolean endbit;
int tmpShiftReg;
tmpShiftReg = shiftReg;
endbit = ((tmpShiftReg & 0x8000) != 0);
tmpShiftReg = tmpShiftReg << 1;
if ( endbit )
tmpShiftReg = tmpShiftReg ^ 0x100b;
tmpShiftReg++;
tmpShiftReg = tmpShiftReg & 0xffff;
shiftReg = tmpShiftReg;
tmpShiftReg = tmpShiftReg ^ mask;
return tmpShiftReg;
}
}
public class EBSPoint
{
public byte[] x;
public byte[] y;
public EBSPoint()
{
x = new byte[EccM.NUMWORDS];
y = new byte[EccM.NUMWORDS];
}
public EBSPoint p_copy()
{
EBSPoint copy = new EBSPoint();
System.arraycopy( x, 0, copy.x, 0, EccM.NUMWORDS );
System.arraycopy( y, 0, copy.y, 0, EccM.NUMWORDS );
return copy;
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}
public boolean isZero()
{
for (int i = 0; i < EccM.NUMWORDS; i++ )
if ( x[i] != 0 || y[i] != 0)
return false;
return true;
}
public boolean isEqual( EBSPoint ebsp )
{
return EccM.b_isequal( x, ebsp.x ) && EccM.b_isequal( y, ebsp.y );
}
public short[] getShortX()
{
short[] sx = new short[EccM.NUMWORDS];
for ( int i=0; i < x.length; i++ )
{
sx[i] = (short) (x[i] & 0xff);
}
return sx;
}
public short[] getShortY()
{
short[] sy = new short[EccM.NUMWORDS];
for ( int i=0; i < y.length; i++ )
{
sy[i] = (short) (y[i] & 0xff);
}
return sy;
}
}
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import java.math.BigInteger;
public class EBSCurve
{
public byte[] a4;
public byte[] a6;
public byte[] modulus;
public int bitlength;
public EBSCurve()
{
a4 = new byte[EccM.NUMWORDS];
a4[EccM.NUMWORDS-1] = 1;
a6 = new byte[EccM.NUMWORDS];
a6[EccM.NUMWORDS-1] = 1;
modulus = new byte[EccM.NUMWORDS];
EccM.b_setbit( modulus,
EccM.b_setbit( modulus,
EccM.b_setbit( modulus,
EccM.b_setbit( modulus,
EccM.b_setbit( modulus,
bitlength = 164;

163 );
7 );
6 );
3 );
0 );

}
}
public class Message { }
public class KeyMessage extends Message
{
int sourceID;
short isX;
short[] coord;
public KeyMessage( int id, short x, short[] c )
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{
sourceID = id;
isX = x;
coord = c;
}
public int get_sourceID()
{
return sourceID;
}
public short get_isX()
{
return isX;
}
public short[] get_coord()
{
return coord;
}
}
import java.io.*;
public class SimLogger
{
int size;
String simType;
int experiment;
int[] keySelection;
long[] times;
int[] trials;
long simStart;
long simEnd;
public SimLogger( int size, String simType, int experiment )
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{
this.size = size;
this.simType = simType;
this.experiment = experiment;
keySelection[size];
times = new long[size];
trials = new int[size];
}
public void logResults( int mote, long time, int tries )
{
times[mote] = time;
trials[mote] = tries;
}
public void logKeySelection( int mote, int selection )
{
keySelection[mote] = selection;
}
public void writeResults()
{
try
{
String filename = size + "-" + simType + "-" + experiment + ".sr";
PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter(filename)));
out.println( "Network size: " + size );
out.println( "Sim Time: " + (simEnd - simStart) );
for ( int i=0; i < size; i++ )
{
out.println( i + ";" + times[i] + ";" + trials[i] + ";" + keySelection[i] );
}
out.close();
}
catch ( IOException ioex )
{
ioex.printStackTrace();
}
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}
}
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Appendix F: MaximalLFSR Code
module MaximalLFSR
{
provides interface Random;
}
implementation
{
uint16_t shiftReg;
uint16_t initSeed;
/* Initialize the seed from the ID of the node */
async command result_t Random.init() {
dbg(DBG_BOOT, "RANDOM_LFSR initialized.\n");
atomic {
shiftReg = (TOS_LOCAL_ADDRESS + 1);
initSeed = shiftReg;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
async command result_t Random.initseed(uint16_t s) {
atomic {
shiftReg = (s + 1);
initSeed = shiftReg;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* Return the next 16 bit random number */
async command uint16_t Random.rand() {
bool endbit;
uint16_t tmpShiftReg;
atomic {
tmpShiftReg = shiftReg;
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endbit = ((tmpShiftReg >> 16) ^ (tmpShiftReg >> 5) ^ (tmpShiftReg >> 3) ^
(tmpShiftReg >> 2) ^ (tmpShiftReg)) & 0x0001;
if (endbit)
tmpShiftReg = (tmpShiftReg >> 1) | 0x8000;
else
tmpShiftReg = tmpShiftReg >> 1;
shiftReg = tmpShiftReg;
}
return tmpShiftReg;
}
async command uint32_t Random.rand32() {
return (uint32_t)call Random.rand() << 16 | call Random.rand();
}
uint16_t TOSH_rand() __attribute__((C)) {
return call Random.rand();
}
}
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